Actualidad

Duracion Ingreso a personas incompetentes para juicio

24 de Octubre de 2007

Resumenes jurisprudencia federal que controla.

U.S. Supreme Court JACKSON v. INDIANA, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) 406 U.S. 715 JACKSON v. INDIANA
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA

No. 70-5009.

Argued November 18, 1971
Decided June 7, 1972The Indiana procedure for pretrial commitment of incompetent criminal defendants set forth in Ind. Ann. Stat. 9-1706a provides that a trial judge with "reasonable ground" to believe the defendant to be incompetent to stand trial must appoint two examining physicians and schedule a competency hearing, at which the defendant may introduce evidence. If the court, on the basis of the physicians' report and "other evidence," finds that the defendant lacks "comprehension sufficient to understand the proceedings and make his defense," the trial is delayed and the defendant is remanded to the state department of mental health for commitment to an "appropriate psychiatric institution" until defendant shall become "sane." Other statutory provisions apply to commitment of citizens who are "feeble-minded, and are therefore unable properly to care for themselves." The procedures for committing such persons are substantially similar to those for determining a criminal defendant's pretrial competency, but a person committed as "feeble-minded" may be released "at any time" his condition warrants it in the judgment of the superintendent of the institution. Indiana also has a comprehensive commitment scheme for the "mentally ill," i. e., those with a "psychiatric disorder" as defined by the statute, who can be committed on a showing of mental illness and need for "care, treatment, training or detention." A person so committed may be released when the superintendent of the institution shall discharge him, or when he is cured. Petitioner in this case, a mentally defective deaf mute, who cannot read, write, or virtually otherwise communicate, was charged with two criminal offenses and committed under the 9-1706a procedure. The doctors' report showed that petitioner's condition precluded his understanding the nature of the charges against him or participating in his defense and their testimony showed that the prognosis was "rather dim"; that even if petitioner were not a deaf mute he would be incompetent to stand trial; and that petitioner's intelligence was not sufficient to enable him ever to develop the necessary communication skills. According to a deaf-school interpreter's testimony, the State had no facilities that could help petitioner Page 406 U.S. 715, 716learn minimal communication skills. After finding that petitioner "lack[ed] comprehension sufficient to make his defense," the court ordered petitioner committed until such time as the health department could certify petitioner's sanity to the court. Petitioner's counsel filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied. The State Supreme Court affirmed. Contending that his commitment was tantamount to a "life sentence" without his having been convicted of a crime, petitioner claims that commitment under 9-1706a deprived him of equal protection because, absent the criminal charges against him, the State would have had to proceed under the other statutory procedures for the feeble-minded or those for the mentally ill, under either of which petitioner would have been entitled to substantially greater rights. Petitioner also asserts that indefinite commitment under the section deprived him of due process and subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment. Held: 1. By subjecting petitioner to a more lenient commitment standard and to a more stringent standard of release than those generally applicable to all other persons not charged with offenses, thus condemning petitioner to permanent institutionalization without the showing required for commitment or the opportunity for release afforded by ordinary civil commitment procedures, Indiana deprived petitioner of equal protection. Cf. Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107. Pp. 723-731. 2. Indiana's indefinite commitment of a criminal defendant solely on account of his lack of capacity to stand trial violates due process. Such a defendant cannot be held more than the reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that he will attain competency in the foreseeable future. If it is determined that he will not, the State must either institute civil proceedings applicable to indefinite commitment of those not charged with crime, or release the defendant. Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366, distinguished. Pp. 731-739. 3. Since the issue of petitioner's criminal responsibility at the time of the alleged offenses (as distinguished from the issue of his competency to stand trial) has not been determined and other matters of defense may remain to be resolved, it would be premature for this Court to dismiss the charges against petitioner. Pp. 739-741. 253 Ind. 487, 255 N. E. 2d 515, reversed and remanded. [406 U.S. 715, 717]

53 Am. Jur. 2d Mentally Impaired Persons § 31American Jurisprudence, Second Edition
Database updated July 2007

Mentally Impaired Persons
Romualdo P. Eclavea, J.D., Lucas D. Martin, J.D.

II. Civil Commitment Proceedings
C. Hearings
1. Right to a Hearing
c. Hearing Rights of Particular Persons
Topic Summary  Correlation Table  References  

§ 31. Persons committed due to incompetency to stand trial

West's Key Number Digest

West's Key Number Digest, Mental Health 36, 41

A person charged by a state with a criminal offense who is committed solely on account of his or her incapacity to proceed to trial cannot be held more than the reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that he or she will attain that capacity in the foreseeable future, and if the state is unable to obtain the individual's competency, the state must either institute civil-commitment proceedings or release the individual.[FN1] Furthermore, even if it is determined that the defendant probably soon will be able to stand trial, his or her continued commitment must be justified by progress toward that goal.[FN2] Thus, in order for an individual to be committed after a finding of incompetency to proceed, a hearing is required,[FN3] although statutes which allow for a limited commitment period without a hearing, in order to evaluate whether there is a substantial probability that the defendant will become competent to stand trial, are valid, since the commitment was only temporary, not indefinite.[FN4]

 
[FN1] Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 92 S. Ct. 1845, 32 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1972).[FN2] Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 92 S. Ct. 1845, 32 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1972).[FN3] Schock v. Thomas, 274 Ark. 493, 625 S.W.2d 521 (1981).[FN4] U.S. v. Donofrio, 896 F.2d 1301 (11th Cir. 1990) (interpreting 18 U.S.C.A. § 4241); U.S. v. Shawar, 865 F.2d 856 (7th Cir. 1989); Farrell v. U.S., 646 A.2d 963 (D.C. 1994) (60 day evaluative period). 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law § 116American Jurisprudence, Second Edition
Database updated July 2007

Criminal Law
Laura Dietz, J.D., Tammy Hinshaw, J.D., Theresa Leming, J.D., Lucas Martin, J.D., Lisa Zakolski, J.D., and W. Roger Adams, J.D., Jeffrey L. Cole, J.D., and Anne E. Melley, J.D., of the National Legal Research Group

Part One. General Principles
II. Criminal Responsibility: Capacity Necessary for Commission of Crime or for Trial and Punishment [§§ 34–125]
C. Effect of Insanity or Incompetence [§§ 47–125]
2. Insanity or Incompetency at Time of Trial or Other Proceedings [§§ 93–118]
c. Effect of Determination [§§ 114–117]
Topic Summary  Correlation Table  References  

§ 116. Duration of involuntary commitment resulting from finding of incompetency; generally

It is commonly provided by statute that a defendant found incompetent to stand trial may be committed to a mental hospital until he is competent to stand trial.[FN67] However, due process sets limits upon the duration of such confinement. A person charged with a criminal offense who is involuntarily committed solely on account of his incapacity to proceed to trial cannot be held more than the reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable future.[FN68] If it is determined that this is not the case, then the state must either institute the customary civil commitment proceeding that would be required to commit indefinitely any other citizen, or release the defendant.[FN69] Even if it is determined that the defendant probably soon will be able to stand trial, his continued commitment must be justified by progress toward that goal.[FN70] When it appears that the defendant will never become competent to stand trial, his continued commitment is a violation of due process unless civil commitment proceedings are followed.[FN71]

 
[FN67] Pierce v. State, 57 Ala. App. 633, 330 So. 2d 615 (Crim. App. 1974); Schock v. Thomas, 274 Ark. 493, 625 S.W.2d 521 (1981); People v. Hofferber, 70 Cal. App. 3d 265, 137 Cal. Rptr. 115 (2d Dist. 1977); People v. Gillings, 39 Colo. App. 387, 568 P.2d 92 (1977); People v. Davis, 25 Ill. App. 3d 1007, 324 N.E.2d 58 (5th Dist. 1975); New York City Human Resources Administration-Department of Social Services v. Carey, 107 A.D.2d 625, 484 N.Y.S.2d 10 (1st Dep't 1985).[FN68] Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 92 S. Ct. 1845, 32 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1972).[FN69] Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 92 S. Ct. 1845, 32 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1972).[FN70] Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 92 S. Ct. 1845, 32 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1972).[FN71] State ex rel. Lockhart v. Armistead, 351 So. 2d 496 (La. 1977).AMJUR CRIMLAW § 116

END OF DOCUMENT


 

Más información

Oficinas

Enlaces

Actualidad

© Sociedad para Asistencia Legal