Whiteley v. Warden, Wyo. State Penitentiary
401 U.S. 560, 91 S.Ct. 1031
U.S.Wyo. 1971.
March 29, 1971 (Approx. 10 pages)

Supreme Court of the United StatesHarold WHITELEY
v.
WARDEN, WYOMING STATE PENITENTIARY.
No. 136.
Argued Jan. 13, 1971.
Decided March 29, 1971.

Habeas corpus proceeding brought by state prisoner. The United States District Court for the District of Wyoming, Ewing T. Kerr, J., 293 F.Supp. 381, denied the petition, and petitioner appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the denial, 416 F.2d 36, and petitioner sought certiorari. The Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Harlan, held that arresting officers did not have probable cause for warrantless arrest of defendant by virtue of state police bulletin which was issued pursuant to complaint of sheriff of another county and which was based on informer's tip and sheriff's conclusion that defendant and his companion committed breaking and entering; subsequent search of defendant's automobile and seizure of contraband therefrom were unlawful and violated defendant's rights under Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
Mr. Justice Black, with whom Mr. Chief Justice Burger joined, dissented and filed opinion.
Mr. Justice Blackmun dissented and filed dissenting statement.

Supreme Court of the United StatesFLORIDA, Petitioner,v.J.L.No. 98-1993.Argued Feb. 29, 2000.Decided March 28, 2000.
Juvenile being tried on weapons charge moved to suppress evidence. The Circuit Court of Dade County, Steve Levine, J., granted motion, and state appealed. The District Court of Appeal, 689 So.2d 1116, reversed. Juvenile petitioned for review, and the Florida Supreme Court, 727 So.2d 204, reversed the court of appeal. After granting state's petition for certiorari, the Supreme Court, Justice Ginsburg, held that anonymous tip lacked sufficient indicia of reliability to establish reasonable suspicion for Terry investigatory stop.
Decision of Florida Supreme Court affirmed.
Justice Kennedy filed concurring opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist joined.Unlike a tip from a known informant whose reputation can be assessed and who can be held responsible if her allegations turn out to be fabricated, an anonymous tip alone seldom demonstrates the informant's basis of knowledge or veracity; however, there are situations in which an anonymous tip, suitably corroborated, exhibits sufficient indicia of reliability to provide reasonable suspicion to make the investigatory stop. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.

Anonymous tip stating that young black male standing at particular bus stop and wearing plaid shirt was carrying gun lacked sufficient indicia of reliability to establish reasonable suspicion to make Terry investigatory stop of suspect matching description; tip provided no predictive information that would provide police with means to test informant's knowledge or credibility, so that all police had to rely on was bare report from unknown, unaccountable informant who neither explained how he knew about gun nor supplied any basis for believing he had inside information about suspect. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
An anonymous tip must be reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person, if it is to provide reasonable suspicion for a Terry investigatory stop. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.

There is no general exception to the "indicia of reliability" requirement for anonymous tips alleging possession of firearms; such an exception would enable any person seeking to harass another to set in motion an intrusive, embarrassing investigatory stop of the targeted person simply by placing an anonymous call and falsely reporting the target's unlawful carriage of a gun. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.**1376 Syllabus [FN*]FN* The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337, 26 S.Ct. 282, 50 L.Ed. 499.After an anonymous caller reported to the Miami-Dade Police that a young black male standing at a particular bus stop and wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a gun, officers went to the bus stop and saw three black males, one of whom, respondent J. L., was wearing a plaid shirt. Apart from the tip, the officers had no reason to suspect any of the three of illegal conduct. The officers did not see a firearm or observe any unusual movements. One of the officers frisked J.L. and seized a gun from his pocket. J.L., who was then almost 16, was charged under state law with carrying a concealed firearm without a license and possessing a firearm while under the age of 18. The trial court granted his motion to suppress the gun as the fruit of an unlawful search. The intermediate appellate court reversed, but the Supreme Court of Florida quashed that decision and held the search invalid under the Fourth Amendment.
Held: An anonymous tip that a person is carrying a gun is not, without more, sufficient to justify a police officer's stop and frisk of that person. An officer, for the protection of himself and others, may conduct a carefully limited search for weapons in the outer clothing of persons engaged in unusual conduct where, inter alia, the officer reasonably concludes in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons in question may be armed and presently dangerous. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889. Here, the officers' suspicion that J.L. was carrying a **1377 weapon arose not from their own observations but solely from a call made from an unknown location by an unknown caller. The tip lacked sufficient indicia of reliability to provide reasonable suspicion to make a Terry stop: It provided no predictive information and therefore left the police without means to test the informant's knowledge or credibility. See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 327, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301. The contentions of Florida and the United States as amicus that the tip was reliable because it accurately described J.L.'s visible attributes misapprehend the reliability needed for a tip to justify a Terry stop. The reasonable suspicion here at issue requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person. This Court also declines to adopt the argument that the standard Terry analysis should be modified to license a "firearm exception," under which a tip alleging an illegal gun would justify a stop and frisk even if *267 the accusation would fail standard pre-search reliability testing. The facts of this case do not require the Court to speculate about the circumstances under which the danger alleged in an anonymous tip might be so great--e.g., a report of a person carrying a bomb--as to justify a search even without a showing of reliability. Pp. 1378-1380.
727 So.2d 204, affirmed.
GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. KENNEDY, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., joined, post, p. 1380.
Michael J. Neimand, Miami, FL, for petitioner.
Irving L. Gornstein, Washington, DC, for the United States as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court.
Harvey J. Sepler, Miami, FL, for respondent.


*268 Justice GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented in this case is whether an anonymous tip that a person is carrying a gun is, without more, sufficient to justify a police officer's stop and frisk of that person. We hold that it is not.IOn October 13, 1995, an anonymous caller reported to the Miami-Dade Police that a young black male standing at a particular bus stop and wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a gun. App. to Pet. for Cert. A-40 to A-41. So far as the record reveals, there is no audio recording of the tip, and nothing is known about the informant. Sometime after the police received the tip--the record does not say how long--two officers were instructed to respond. They arrived at the bus stop about six minutes later and saw three black males "just hanging out [there]." Id., at A-42. One of the three, respondent J.L., was wearing a plaid shirt. Id., at A-41. Apart from the tip, the officers had no reason to suspect any of the three of illegal conduct. The officers did not see a firearm, and J.L. made no threatening or otherwise unusual movements. Id., at A-42 to A-44. One of the officers approached J.L., told him to put his hands up on the bus stop, frisked him, and seized a gun from J.L.'s pocket. The second officer frisked the other two individuals, against whom no allegations had been made, and found nothing.
*269 J.L., who was at the time of the frisk "10 days shy of his 16th birth [day]," Tr. of Oral Arg. 6, was charged under state law with carrying a concealed firearm without a license and possessing a firearm while under the age of 18. He moved to suppress the gun as the fruit of an unlawful search, and the trial court granted his motion. The intermediate appellate court reversed, but the Supreme Court of Florida **1378 quashed that decision and held the search invalid under the Fourth Amendment. 727 So.2d 204 (1998).
Anonymous tips, the Florida Supreme Court stated, are generally less reliable than tips from known informants and can form the basis for reasonable suspicion only if accompanied by specific indicia of reliability, for example, the correct forecast of a subject's " 'not easily predicted' " movements. Id., at 207 (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990)). The tip leading to the frisk of J.L., the court observed, provided no such predictions, nor did it contain any other qualifying indicia of reliability. 727 So.2d, at 207-208. Two justices dissented. The safety of the police and the public, they maintained, justifies a "firearm exception" to the general rule barring investigatory stops and frisks on the basis of bare-boned anonymous tips. Id., at 214-215.
Seeking review in this Court, the State of Florida noted that the decision of the State's Supreme Court conflicts with decisions of other courts declaring similar searches compatible with the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. DeBerry, 76 F.3d 884, 886-887 (C.A.7 1996); United States v. Clipper, 973 F.2d 944, 951 (C.A.D.C.1992). We granted certiorari, 528 U.S. 963, 120 S.Ct. 395, 145 L.Ed.2d 308 (1999), and now affirm the judgment of the Florida Supreme Court.IIOur "stop and frisk" decisions begin with Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). This Court held in Terry:
"[W]here a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his *270 experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him." Id., at 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868.
[1] In the instant case, the officers' suspicion that J.L. was carrying a weapon arose not from any observations of their own but solely from a call made from an unknown location by an unknown caller. Unlike a tip from a known informant whose reputation can be assessed and who can be held responsible if her allegations turn out to be fabricated, see Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146-147, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972), "an anonymous tip alone seldom demonstrates the informant's basis of knowledge or veracity," Alabama v. White, 496 U.S., at 329, 110 S.Ct. 2412. As we have recognized, however, there are situations in which an anonymous tip, suitably corroborated, exhibits "sufficient indicia of reliability to provide reasonable suspicion to make the investigatory stop." Id., at 327, 110 S.Ct. 2412. The question we here confront is whether the tip pointing to J.L. had those indicia of reliability.
In White, the police received an anonymous tip asserting that a woman was carrying cocaine and predicting that she would leave an apartment building at a specified time, get into a car matching a particular description, and drive to a named motel. Ibid. Standing alone, the tip would not have justified a Terry stop. 496 U.S., at 329, 110 S.Ct. 2412. Only after police observation showed that the informant had accurately predicted the woman's movements, we explained, did it become reasonable to think the tipster had inside knowledge about the suspect and therefore to credit his assertion about the cocaine. *271 Id., at 332, 110 S.Ct. 2412. **1379 Although the Court held that the suspicion in White became reasonable after police surveillance, we regarded the case as borderline. Knowledge about a person's future movements indicates some familiarity with that person's affairs, but having such knowledge does not necessarily imply that the informant knows, in particular, whether that person is carrying hidden contraband. We accordingly classified White as a "close case." Ibid.
[2] The tip in the instant case lacked the moderate indicia of reliability present in White and essential to the Court's decision in that case. The anonymous call concerning J.L. provided no predictive information and therefore left the police without means to test the informant's knowledge or credibility. That the allegation about the gun turned out to be correct does not suggest that the officers, prior to the frisks, had a reasonable basis for suspecting J.L. of engaging in unlawful conduct: The reasonableness of official suspicion must be measured by what the officers knew before they conducted their search. All the police had to go on in this case was the bare report of an unknown, unaccountable informant who neither explained how he knew about the gun nor supplied any basis for believing he had inside information about J.L. If White was a close case on the reliability of anonymous tips, this one surely falls on the other side of the line.
Florida contends that the tip was reliable because its description of the suspect's visible attributes proved accurate: There really was a young black male wearing a plaid shirt at the bus stop. Brief for Petitioner 20- 21. The United States as amicus curiae makes a similar argument, proposing that a stop and frisk should be permitted "when (1) an anonymous tip provides a description of a particular person at a particular location illegally carrying a concealed firearm, (2) police promptly verify the pertinent details of the tip except the existence of the firearm, and (3) there are no factors that cast doubt on the reliability of the tip...." Brief *272 for United States 16. These contentions misapprehend the reliability needed for a tip to justify a Terry stop.
[3] An accurate description of a subject's readily observable location and appearance is of course reliable in this limited sense: It will help the police correctly identify the person whom the tipster means to accuse. Such a tip, however, does not show that the tipster has knowledge of concealed criminal activity. The reasonable suspicion here at issue requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person. Cf. 4 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.4(h), p. 213 (3d ed.1996) (distinguishing reliability as to identification, which is often important in other criminal law contexts, from reliability as to the likelihood of criminal activity, which is central in anonymous-tip cases).
A second major argument advanced by Florida and the United States as amicus is, in essence, that the standard Terry analysis should be modified to license a "firearm exception." Under such an exception, a tip alleging an illegal gun would justify a stop and frisk even if the accusation would fail standard pre-search reliability testing. We decline to adopt this position.
[4] Firearms are dangerous, and extraordinary dangers sometimes justify unusual precautions. Our decisions recognize the serious threat that armed criminals pose to public safety; Terry 's rule, which permits protective police searches on the basis of reasonable suspicion rather than demanding that officers meet the higher standard of probable cause, responds to this very concern. See 392 U.S., at 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868. But an automatic firearm exception to our established reliability analysis would rove too far. Such an exception would enable any person seeking to harass another to set in motion an intrusive, embarrassing **1380 police search of the targeted person simply by placing an anonymous call falsely reporting the target's unlawful carriage of a gun. Nor could one securely confine such an exception to allegations involving firearms. *273 Several Courts of Appeals have held it per se foreseeable for people carrying significant amounts of illegal drugs to be carrying guns as well. See, e.g., United States v. Sakyi, 160 F.3d 164, 169 (C.A.4 1998); United States v. Dean, 59 F.3d 1479, 1490, n. 20 (C.A.5 1995); United States v. Odom, 13 F.3d 949, 959 (C.A.6 1994); United States v. Martinez, 958 F.2d 217, 219 (C.A.8 1992). If police officers may properly conduct Terry frisks on the basis of bare-boned tips about guns, it would be reasonable to maintain under the above-cited decisions that the police should similarly have discretion to frisk based on bare-boned tips about narcotics. As we clarified when we made indicia of reliability critical in Adams and White, the Fourth Amendment is not so easily satisfied. Cf. Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 393-394, 117 S.Ct. 1416, 137 L.Ed.2d 615 (1997) (rejecting a per se exception to the "knock and announce" rule for narcotics cases partly because "the reasons for creating an exception in one category [of Fourth Amendment cases] can, relatively easily, be applied to others," thus allowing the exception to swallow the rule). [FN*]FN* At oral argument, petitioner also advanced the position that J.L.'s youth made the stop and frisk valid, because it is a crime in Florida for persons under the age of 21 to carry concealed firearms. See Fla. Stat. § 790.01 (1997) (carrying a concealed weapon without a license is a misdemeanor), § 790.06(2)(b) (only persons aged 21 or older may be licensed to carry concealed weapons). This contention misses the mark. Even assuming that the arresting officers could be sure that J.L. was under 21, they would have had reasonable suspicion that J.L. was engaged in criminal activity only if they could be confident that he was carrying a gun in the first place. The mere fact that a tip, if true, would describe illegal activity does not mean that the police may make a Terry stop without meeting the reliability requirement, and the fact that J.L. was under 21 in no way made the gun tip more reliable than if he had been an adult.The facts of this case do not require us to speculate about the circumstances under which the danger alleged in an anonymous tip might be so great as to justify a search even without a showing of reliability. We do not say, for example, that a report of a person carrying a bomb need bear the *274 indicia of reliability we demand for a report of a person carrying a firearm before the police can constitutionally conduct a frisk. Nor do we hold that public safety officials in quarters where the reasonable expectation of Fourth Amendment privacy is diminished, such as airports, see Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 308, 83 L.Ed.2d 165 (1984) (per curiam ), and schools, see New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985), cannot conduct protective searches on the basis of information insufficient to justify searches elsewhere.
Finally, the requirement that an anonymous tip bear standard indicia of reliability in order to justify a stop in no way diminishes a police officer's prerogative, in accord with Terry, to conduct a protective search of a person who has already been legitimately stopped. We speak in today's decision only of cases in which the officer's authority to make the initial stop is at issue. In that context, we hold that an anonymous tip lacking indicia of reliability of the kind contemplated in Adams and White does not justify a stop and frisk whenever and however it alleges the illegal possession of a firearm.
The judgment of the Florida Supreme Court is affirmed.
It is so ordered.

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