Actualidad

Safford v. April Redding

10 de Junio de 2010

Registro ilegal de estudiante en escuela (The search of Savana’s underwear violated the Fourth Amendment)

    (Slip Opinion) OCTOBER  TERM,  2008       1 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES  Syllabus SAFFORD UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT #1 ET AL. v.REDDING CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT No. 08–479.    Argued April 21, 2009—Decided June 25, 2009 After  escorting  13-year-old  Savana  Redding  from  her  middle  school classroom to his office, Assistant Principal Wilson showed her a day planner containing knives and other contraband.  She admitted own- ing the planner, but said that she had lent it to her friend Marissa and that the contraband was not hers.   He then produced four pre- scription-strength,  and  one  over-the-counter,  pain  relief  pills,  all  of which  are  banned  under  school  rules  without  advance  permission. She denied knowledge of them, but Wilson said that he had a report that she was giving pills to fellow students.  She denied it and agreedto let him search her belongings.  He and Helen Romero, an adminis- trative assistant, searched Savana’s backpack, finding nothing.   Wil-son  then  had  Romero  take  Savana  to  the  school  nurse’s  office  to search  her  clothes  for  pills.    After  Romero  and  the  nurse,  Peggy Schwallier,  had  Savana  remove  her  outer  clothing,  they  told  her  topull her bra out and shake it, and to pull out the elastic on her un- derpants, thus exposing her breasts and pelvic area to some degree. No  pills  were  found.   Savana’s  mother  filed  suit  against  petitioner school  district  (Safford),  Wilson,  Romero,  and  Schwallier,  allegingthat  the  strip  search  violated  Savana’s  Fourth  Amendment  rights. Claiming  qualified  immunity,  the  individuals  (hereinafter  petition- ers) moved for summary judgment.   The District Court granted themotion, finding that there was no Fourth Amendment violation, and the en banc Ninth Circuit reversed.  Following the protocol for evaluating qualified immunity claims, see Saucier v. Katz, 533 U. S. 194,200,  the  court  held  that  the  strip  search  was  unjustified  under  the Fourth Amendment test for searches of children by school officials set out in New Jersey v. T. L. O., 469 U. S. 325.  It then applied the test

 for qualified immunity.   Finding that Savana’s right was clearly es- tablished  at  the  time  of  the  search,  it  reversed  the  summary  judgment as to Wilson, but affirmed as to Schwallier and Romero because they were not independent decisionmakers.Held:1. The  search of  Savana’s  underwear  violated  the  Fourth  Amend- ment.  Pp. 3–11.(a) For  school  searches,  “the  public  interest  is  best  served  by  aFourth  Amendment  standard  of  reasonableness  that  stops  short  of probable cause.” T. L. O., 469 U. S., at 341.  Under the resulting reasonable  suspicion standard, a school search “will be  permissible  . . . when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectivesof the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sexof the student and the nature of the infraction.”  Id., at 342.  The re- quired knowledge component of reasonable suspicion for a school ad-ministrator’s  evidence  search  is  that  it  raise  a  moderate  chance  offinding evidence of wrongdoing.  Pp. 3–5.(b) Wilson had sufficient suspicion to justify searching Savana’s backpack and outer clothing.  A week earlier, a student, Jordan, had told the principal and Wilson that students were bringing drugs and weapons to school and that he had gotten sick from some pills.   On the  day  of  the  search,  Jordan  gave  Wilson  a  pill  that  he  said  came from Marissa.  Learning that the pill was prescription strength, Wil- son  called  Marissa  out  of  class  and  was  handed  the  day  planner. Once  in  his  office,  Wilson,  with  Romero  present,  had  Marissa  turn out her pockets and open her wallet, producing, inter alia, an over- the-counter pill that Marissa claimed was Savana’s.  She also denied knowing  about  the  day  planner’s  contents.   Wilson  did  not  ask  her when she received the pills from Savana or where Savana might be hiding them.   After a search of Marissa’s underwear by Romero and Schwallier revealed no additional pills, Wilson called Savana into his office.   He  showed  her  the day  planner  and  confirmed her  relation- ship  with  Marissa.   He  knew  that  the  girls  had  been  identified  as part of an unusually rowdy group at a school dance, during which al- cohol and cigarettes were found in the girls’ bathroom.  He had other reasons  to  connect  them  with  this  contraband,  for  Jordan  had  told the principal that before the dance, he had attended a party at Sa- vana’s  house  where  alcohol was  served.   Thus,  Marissa’s  statement that the pills came from Savana was sufficiently plausible to warrant suspicion  that  Savana  was  involved  in  pill  distribution.   A  student who  is  reasonably  suspected  of  giving  out  contraband  pills  is  rea- sonably  suspected  of  carrying  them  on  her  person  and  in  her  back- pack.  Looking into Savana’s bag, in her presence and in the relative privacy  of  Wilson’s  office,  was  not  excessively  intrusive,  any  more

 Syllabus than Romero’s subsequent search of her outer clothing.  Pp. 5–8.(c) Because the suspected facts pointing to Savana did not indi- cate that the drugs presented a danger to students or were concealedin her underwear, Wilson did not have sufficient suspicion to warrantextending the search to the point of making Savana pull out her un- derwear.  Romero and Schwallier said that they did not see anythingwhen  Savana  pulled  out  her  underwear,  but  a  strip  search  and  itsFourth Amendment consequences are not defined by who was looking and how much was seen.   Savana’s actions in their presence neces-sarily exposed her breasts and pelvic area to some degree, and bothsubjective  and  reasonable  societal  expectations  of  personal  privacy support the treatment of such a search as categorically  distinct, re-quiring distinct elements of justification on the part of school authori-ties for going beyond a search of outer clothing and belongings.   Sa- vana’s subjective expectation of privacy is inherent in her account ofit  as  embarrassing,  frightening,  and  humiliating.    The  reasonable-ness of her expectation is indicated by the common reaction of other young  people  similarly  searched,  whose  adolescent  vulnerability  in-tensifies the exposure’s patent intrusiveness.   Its indignity does not outlaw the search, but it does implicate the rule that “the search [be]‘reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified theinterference  in  the  first  place.’ ”  T. L. O.,  supra,  at  341.   Here,  the content of the suspicion failed to match the degree of intrusion.   Be- cause  Wilson  knew  that  the  pills  were  common  pain  relievers,  he must have known of their nature and limited threat and had no rea- son to suspect that large amounts were being passed around or that individual  students  had  great  quantities.    Nor  could  he  have  sus- pected that Savana was hiding common painkillers in her underwear. When suspected facts must support the categorically extreme intru- siveness of a search down to an adolescent’s body, petitioners’ general belief  that  students  hide  contraband  in  their  clothing  falls  short;  a reasonable search that extensive calls for suspicion that it will suc- ceed.  Nondangerous school contraband does not conjure up the spec- ter of stashes in intimate places, and there is no evidence of such be- havior  at  the  school;  neither  Jordan  nor  Marissa  suggested  that Savana  was  doing  that,  and  the  search  of  Marissa  yielded  nothing. Wilson  also  never  determined  when  Marissa  had  received  the  pills from Savana; had it been a few days before, that would weigh heavily against  any  reasonable  conclusion  that  Savana  presently  had  the pills on her person, much less in her underwear.  Pp. 8–11.2. Although the strip search violated Savana’s Fourth Amendment rights, petitioners Wilson, Romero, and Schwallier are protected fromliability by qualified immunity because “clearly established law [did]not show that the search violated the Fourth Amendment,” Pearson

 v. Callahan, 555 U. S.       ,        .  The intrusiveness of the strip search here cannot, under T. L. O., be seen as justifiably related to the cir- cumstances, but lower court cases viewing school strip searches dif- ferently are numerous enough, with well-reasoned majority and dis- senting  opinions,  to  counsel  doubt  about  the  clarity  with  which  the right was previously stated.  Pp. 11–13.3. The  issue  of  petitioner  Safford’s  liability  under  Monell  v.  NewYork  City  Dept.  of  Social  Servs.,  436  U. S.  658,  694,  should  be  ad- dressed on remand.  P. 13.531 F. 3d 1071, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. SOUTER,  J.,  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  ROBERTS, C. J.,  and  SCALIA,  KENNEDY,  BREYER,  and  ALITO,  JJ.,  joined,  and  in which STEVENS and GINSBURG, JJ., joined as to Parts I–III.  STEVENS, J., filed  an  opinion  concurring  in  part  and  dissenting  in  part,  in  which GINSBURG, J., joined.   GINSBURG, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.   THOMAS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.

 Opinion of the Court NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary  print of  the  United  States  Reports.    Readers  are  requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash- ington,  D. C.  20543,  of  any  typographical  or  other  formal  errors,  in  order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 08–479  SAFFORD UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT #1, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. APRIL REDDING ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT [June 25, 2009] JUSTICE SOUTER delivered the opinion of the Court.The issue here is whether a 13-year-old student’s FourthAmendment right was violated when she was subjected toa  search  of  her  bra  and  underpants  by  school  officials acting  on  reasonable  suspicion  that  she  had  brought  for-bidden  prescription  and  over-the-counter  drugs  to  school.Because  there  were  no  reasons  to  suspect  the  drugs  pre- sented  a  danger  or  were  concealed  in  her  underwear,  we hold  that  the  search  did  violate  the  Constitution,  but because there is reason to question the clarity with which the  right  was  established,  the  official  who  ordered  the unconstitutional  search  is  entitled  to  qualified  immunity from liability. IThe events immediately prior to the search in question began  in  13-year-old  Savana  Redding’s  math  class  at Safford Middle School one October day in 2003.  The assis- tant  principal  of  the  school,  Kerry  Wilson,  came  into  the room  and  asked  Savana  to  go  to  his  office.                                      There,  he showed her a day planner, unzipped and open flat on his desk, in which there were several knives, lighters, a per-

 Opinion of the Court manent  marker,  and  a  cigarette.  Wilson  asked  Savana whether the planner was hers; she said it was, but that a few  days  before  she  had  lent  it  to  her  friend,  Marissa Glines.  Savana stated that none of the items in the plan- ner belonged to her.Wilson  then  showed  Savana  four  white  prescription- strength ibuprofen 400-mg pills, and one over-the-counterblue  naproxen  200-mg  pill,  all  used  for  pain  and  inflam- mation  but  banned  under  school  rules  without  advancepermission.  He asked Savana if she knew anything about the pills.  Savana answered that she did not.  Wilson then told  Savana  that  he  had  received  a  report  that  she  wasgiving these pills to fellow students; Savana denied it and agreed  to  let  Wilson  search  her  belongings.        Helen  Ro-mero,  an  administrative  assistant,  came  into  the  office, and  together  with  Wilson  they  searched  Savana’s  back- pack, finding nothing.At that point, Wilson instructed Romero to take Savanato the school nurse’s office to search her clothes for pills. Romero and the nurse, Peggy Schwallier, asked Savana toremove her jacket, socks, and shoes, leaving her in stretch pants and a T-shirt (both without pockets), which she wasthen  asked  to  remove. Finally,  Savana  was  told  to  pull her bra out and to the side and shake it, and to pull out the  elastic  on  her  underpants,  thus  exposing  her  breastsand pelvic area to some degree.  No pills were found.Savana’s   mother   filed   suit   against   Safford   UnifiedSchool  District  #1,  Wilson,  Romero,  and  Schwallier  for conducting  a strip search in violation of Savana’s Fourth Amendment rights.   The individuals (hereinafter petition- ers)  moved  for  summary  judgment,  raising  a  defense  of qualified immunity.   The District Court for the District of Arizona granted the motion on the ground that there was no Fourth Amendment violation, and a panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed.  504 F. 3d 828 (2007).A  closely  divided  Circuit  sitting  en  banc,  however,  re-

 versed. Following  the  two-step  protocol  for  evaluating claims  of  qualified  immunity,  see  Saucier  v.  Katz,  533U. S. 194, 200 (2001), the Ninth Circuit held that the strip search was unjustified under the Fourth Amendment testfor searches of children by school officials set out in NewJersey  v.  T. L. O.,  469  U. S.  325  (1985).   531  F. 3d  1071,1081–1087  (2008).   The  Circuit  then  applied  the  test  for qualified  immunity,  and  found  that  Savana’s  right  was clearly  established  at  the  time  of  the  search:  “ ‘[t]hese notions  of  personal  privacy  are  “clearly  established”  in that  they  inhere  in  all  of  us,  particularly  middle  school teenagers,  and  are  inherent  in  the  privacy  component  of the  Fourth  Amendment’s  proscription  against  unreason- able  searches.’ ”          Id.,  at  1088–1089  (quoting  Brannum  v. Overton Cty. School Bd., 516 F. 3d 489, 499 (CA6 2008)). The  upshot  was  reversal  of  summary  judgment  as  to Wilson, while affirming the judgments in favor of Schwal- lier,  the  school  nurse,  and  Romero,  the  administrative assistant,  since  they  had  not  acted  as  independent  deci- sionmakers.  531 F. 3d, at 1089.

We  granted  certiorari,  555  U. S.       
(2009),  and  now

affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. IIThe Fourth Amendment “right of the people to be secure in  their  persons  . . .  against  unreasonable  searches  and seizures”  generally  requires  a  law  enforcement  officer  to have  probable  cause  for  conducting  a  search.                                  “Probable cause exists where ‘the facts and circumstances within [an officer’s]  knowledge  and  of  which  [he]  had  reasonably trustworthy  information  [are]  sufficient  in  themselves  to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that’ an offense  has  been  or  is  being  committed,”  Brinegar  v. United  States,  338  U. S.  160,  175–176  (1949)  (quoting Carroll  v.  United  States,  267  U. S.  132,  162  (1925)),  and that evidence bearing on that offense will be found in the


  place to be searched.
Opinion of the Court

In  T. L. O.,  we  recognized  that  the  school  setting  “re- quires some modification of the level of suspicion of illicit activity needed to justify a search,” 469 U. S., at 340, and held that for searches by school officials “a careful balanc- ing  of  governmental  and  private  interests  suggests  that the public interest is best served by a Fourth Amendment standard  of  reasonableness  that  stops  short  of  probable cause,”  id.,  at  341.   We  have  thus  applied  a  standard  of reasonable suspicion to determine the legality of a school administrator’s  search  of  a  student,  id.,  at  342,  345,  and have held that a school search “will be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably relatedto  the  objectives  of  the  search  and  not  excessively  intru- sive  in  light  of  the  age  and  sex  of  the  student  and  thenature of the infraction,” id., at 342.A  number  of  our  cases  on  probable  cause  have  an  im- plicit  bearing  on  the  reliable  knowledge  element  of  rea- sonable  suspicion,  as  we  have  attempted  to  flesh  out  the knowledge  component  by  looking  to  the  degree  to  which known facts imply prohibited conduct, see, e.g., Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S. 143, 148 (1972); id., at 160, n. 9 (Mar- shall,  J.,  dissenting),  the  specificity  of  the  information received, see, e.g., Spinelli v. United States, 393 U. S. 410,416–417 (1969), and the reliability of its source, see, e.g.,Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U. S. 108, 114 (1964).  At the end of the  day,  however,  we  have  realized  that  these  factors cannot rigidly control, Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213, 230 (1983),  and  we  have  come  back  to  saying  that  the  stan- dards are “fluid concepts that take their substantive con- tent from the particular contexts” in which they are being assessed.       Ornelas  v.  United  States,  517  U. S.  690,  696 (1996).Perhaps  the  best  that  can  be  said  generally  about  the required knowledge component of probable cause for a lawenforcement officer’s evidence search is that it raise a “fair

 probability,”  Gates,  462  U. S.,  at  238,  or  a  “substantial chance,” id., at 244, n. 13, of discovering evidence of crimi- nal activity.  The lesser standard for school searches could as  readily  be  described  as  a  moderate  chance  of  finding evidence of wrongdoing. III AIn  this  case,  the  school’s  policies  strictly  prohibit  the nonmedical use, possession, or sale of any drug on school grounds, including “ ‘[a]ny prescription or over-the-counter drug,  except  those  for  which  permission  to  use  in  school has been granted pursuant to Board policy.’ ”  App. to Pet. for  Cert.  128a.1 A  week  before  Savana  was  searched, another   student,   Jordan   Romero   (no   relation   of   the school’s  administrative  assistant),  told  the  principal  and Assistant  Principal  Wilson  that  “certain  students  were bringing drugs and weapons on campus,” and that he had been  sick  after  taking  some  pills  that  “he  got  from  a classmate.”   App.  8a.   On  the  morning  of  October  8,  the same boy handed Wilson a white pill that he said Marissa Glines had given him.  He told Wilson that students were ——————1 When  the  object  of  a  school  search  is  the  enforcement  of  a  school rule, a valid search assumes, of course, the rule’s legitimacy.   But the legitimacy of the rule usually goes without saying as it does here.  The Court  said  plainly  in  New  Jersey  v.  T.  L.  O.,  469  U. S.  325,  342,  n. 9 (1985), that standards of conduct for schools are for school administra- tors to determine without second-guessing by courts lacking the experi- ence to appreciate what may be needed.   Except in patently arbitrary instances, Fourth Amendment analysis takes the rule as a given, as it obviously should do in this case.  There is no need here either to explain the imperative of keeping drugs out of schools, or to explain the reasons for the school’s rule banning all drugs, no matter how benign, without advance  permission.      Teachers  are  not  pharmacologists  trained  to identify pills and powders, and an effective drug ban has to be enforce- able fast.  The plenary ban makes sense, and there is no basis to claim that the search was unreasonable owing to some defect or shortcomingof the rule it was aimed at enforcing.

 Opinion of the Court planning to take the pills at lunch.Wilson learned from Peggy Schwallier, the school nurse, that  the  pill  was  Ibuprofen  400  mg,  available  only  byprescription.         Wilson  then  called  Marissa  out  of  class.Outside  the  classroom,  Marissa’s  teacher  handed  Wilson the day planner, found within Marissa’s reach, containing various contraband items.   Wilson escorted Marissa backto his office.In  the  presence  of  Helen  Romero,  Wilson  requestedMarissa  to  turn  out  her  pockets  and  open  her  wallet. Marissa  produced  a  blue  pill,  several  white  ones,  and  a razor blade.   Wilson asked where the blue pill came from, and  Marissa  answered,  “ ‘I  guess  it  slipped  in  when  she gave me the IBU 400s.’ ”  Id., at 13a.  When Wilson asked whom  she  meant,  Marissa  replied,  “ ‘Savana  Redding.’ ” Ibid.  Wilson then enquired about the day planner and its contents;  Marissa  denied  knowing  anything  about  them. Wilson  did  not  ask  Marissa  any  followup  questions  to determine whether there was any likelihood that Savana presently had pills: neither asking when Marissa received the pills from Savana nor where Savana might be hiding them.Schwallier  did  not  immediately  recognize  the  blue  pill, but information provided through a poison control hotline2indicated  that  the  pill  was  a  200-mg  dose  of  an  anti- inflammatory drug, generically called naproxen, availableover the counter.  At Wilson’s direction, Marissa was then subjected  to  a  search  of  her  bra  and  underpants  by  Ro- mero and Schwallier, as Savana was later on.  The searchrevealed no additional pills.——————2 Poison  control  centers  across  the  country  maintain  24-hour  help hotlines to provide “immediate access to poison exposure management instructions and information on potential poisons.”   American Associa- tion  of  Poison  Control  Centers,  online  at  http://www.aapcc.org/dnn/ About/tabid/74/Default.aspx (all Internet materials as visited June 19,2009, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file).

 It  was  at  this  juncture  that  Wilson  called  Savana  into his office and showed her the day planner.   Their conver- sation   established   that   Savana   and   Marissa   were   on friendly terms: while she denied knowledge of the contra- band, Savana admitted that the day planner was hers and that she had lent it to Marissa.   Wilson had other reportsof their friendship from staff members, who had identifiedSavana and Marissa as part of an unusually rowdy group at  the  school’s  opening  dance  in  August,  during  which alcohol  and  cigarettes  were  found  in  the  girls’  bathroom. Wilson  had  reason  to  connect  the  girls  with  this  contra- band,  for  Wilson  knew  that  Jordan  Romero  had  told  the principal that before the dance, he had been at a party at Savana’s   house   where   alcohol  was   served.                                                       Marissa’s statement that the pills came from Savana was thus suffi- ciently  plausible  to  warrant  suspicion  that  Savana  was involved in pill distribution.This suspicion of Wilson’s was enough to justify a searchof Savana’s backpack and outer clothing.3    If a student is reasonably suspected of giving out contraband pills, she isreasonably suspected of carrying them on her person and in the carryall that has become an item of student uniformin most places today.   If Wilson’s reasonable suspicion of pill  distribution  were  not  understood  to  support  searchesof  outer  clothes  and  backpack,  it  would  not  justify  anysearch worth making.   And the look into Savana’s bag, in her presence and in the relative privacy of Wilson’s office, was  not  excessively  intrusive,  any  more  than  Romero’s subsequent search of her outer clothing. ——————3 There  is  no  question  here  that  justification  for  the  school  officials’ search was required in accordance with the T. L. O. standard of reason- able suspicion, for it is common ground that Savana had a reasonable expectation of privacy covering the personal things she chose to carry in her backpack, cf. 469 U. S., at 339, and that Wilson’s decision to look through  it  was  a  “search”  within  the  meaning  of  the  Fourth  Amend- ment.

 Opinion of the Court BHere it is that the parties part company, with Savana’s claim that extending the search at Wilson’s behest to the point of making her pull out her underwear was constitu- tionally unreasonable.   The exact label for this final step in the intrusion is not important, though strip search is a fair  way  to  speak  of  it.   Romero  and  Schwallier  directed Savana to remove her clothes down to her underwear, and then “pull out” her bra and the elastic band on her under- pants.     Id.,  at  23a.        Although  Romero  and  Schwallier stated  that  they  did  not  see  anything  when  Savana  fol- lowed  their  instructions,  App.  to  Pet.  for  Cert.  135a,  we would not define strip search and its Fourth Amendment consequences  in  a  way  that  would  guarantee  litigation about who was looking and how much was seen.  The very fact  of  Savana’s  pulling  her  underwear  away  from  her body in the presence of the two officials who were able to see her necessarily exposed her breasts and pelvic area to some  degree,  and  both  subjective  and  reasonable  societal expectations of personal privacy support the treatment of such  a  search  as  categorically  distinct,  requiring  distinct elements  of justification  on  the  part  of  school  authorities for going beyond a search of outer clothing and belongings.Savana’s subjective expectation of privacy against sucha search is inherent in her account of it as embarrassing, frightening,  and  humiliating.   The  reasonableness  of  her expectation  (required  by  the  Fourth  Amendment  stan- dard)  is  indicated  by  the  consistent  experiences  of  other young people similarly searched, whose adolescent vulner- ability intensifies the patent intrusiveness of the exposure. See Brief for National Association of Social Workers et al. as Amici Curiae 6–14; Hyman & Perone, The Other Side of School Violence: Educator Policies and Practices that may Contribute to Student Misbehavior, 36 J. School Psychol- ogy 7, 13  (1998) (strip search can  “result in  serious emo- tional  damage”).         The  common  reaction  of  these  adoles-

 cents simply registers the obviously different meaning of a search  exposing  the  body  from  the  experience  of  naked- ness   or   near   undress   in   other   school   circumstances. Changing for gym is getting ready for play; exposing for a search  is  responding  to  an  accusation  reserved  for  sus- pected wrongdoers and fairly understood as so degrading that  a  number  of  communities  have  decided  that  strip searches   in   schools   are   never   reasonable   and   have banned them     no       matter       what     the    facts              may be, see, e.g., New York City Dept. of Education, Reg. No. A–432,   p.   2   (2005),   online   at   http://docs.nycenet.edu/
docushare/dsweb/Get/Document-21/A-432.pdf(“Underno
circumstances   shall   a   strip-search   of   astudentbe
conducted”).  
The indignity of the search does not, of course, outlaw it, but it does implicate the rule of reasonableness as stated in  T. L. O.,  that  “the  search  as  actually  conducted  [be] reasonably  related  in  scope  to  the  circumstances  which justified the interference in the first place.”   469 U. S., at341 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The scope will be permissible, that is, when it is “not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.”  Id., at 342.Here,  the  content  of  the  suspicion  failed  to  match  the degree of intrusion.  Wilson knew beforehand that the pillswere prescription-strength ibuprofen and over-the-counternaproxen, common pain relievers equivalent to two Advil, or one Aleve.4   He must have been aware of the nature and limited  threat  of  the  specific  drugs  he  was  searching  for, and while just about anything can be taken in quantities that  will  do  real  harm,  Wilson  had  no  reason  to  suspect ——————4 An Advil tablet, caplet, or gel caplet, contains 200 mg of ibuprofen. See  Physicians’  Desk  Reference  for  Nonprescription  Drugs,  Dietary Supplements, and Herbs 674 (28th ed. 2006).  An Aleve caplet contains200 mg naproxen and 20 mg sodium. See id., at 675.

 Opinion of the Court that large amounts of the drugs were being passed around, or that individual students were receiving great numbersof pills.Nor   could   Wilson   have   suspected   that   Savana   was hiding common painkillers in her underwear.   Petitionerssuggest,  as  a  truth  universally  acknowledged,  that  “stu-dents  . . .  hid[e]  contraband  in  or  under  their  clothing,” Reply  Brief  for  Petitioners  8,  and  cite  a  smattering  ofcases of students with contraband in their underwear, id.,at 8–9.   But when the categorically extreme intrusivenessof  a  search  down  to  the  body  of  an  adolescent  requires some  justification  in  suspected  facts,  general  backgroundpossibilities fall short; a reasonable search that extensive calls for suspicion that it will pay off.   But nondangerousschool contraband does not raise the specter of stashes in intimate places, and there is no evidence in the record of any  general  practice  among  Safford  Middle  School  stu-dents  of  hiding  that  sort  of  thing  in  underwear;  neitherJordan nor Marissa suggested to Wilson that Savana was doing  that,  and  the  preceding  search  of  Marissa  thatWilson  ordered  yielded  nothing.    Wilson  never  even  de-termined  when  Marissa  had  received  the  pills  from  Sa- vana; if it had been a few days before, that would weighheavily  against  any  reasonable  conclusion  that  Savanapresently  had  the  pills  on  her  person,  much  less  in  her underwear.In sum, what was missing from the suspected facts thatpointed  to  Savana  was  any  indication  of  danger  to  the students  from  the  power  of  the  drugs  or  their  quantity, and any reason to suppose that Savana was carrying pills in her underwear.  We think that the combination of these deficiencies was fatal to finding the search reasonable.In  so  holding,  we  mean  to  cast  no  ill  reflection  on  the assistant principal, for the record raises no doubt that his motive throughout was to eliminate drugs from his school and protect students from what Jordan Romero had gone

 through.   Parents are known to overreact to protect their children from danger, and a school official with responsi- bility for safety may tend to do the same.  The difference is that the  Fourth  Amendment places limits on the official, even  with  the  high  degree  of  deference  that  courts  must pay to the educator’s professional judgment.We do mean, though, to make it clear that the T. L. O.concern  to  limit  a  school  search  to  reasonable  scope  re- quires the support of reasonable suspicion of danger or of resort  to  underwear  for  hiding  evidence  of  wrongdoing before  a  search  can  reasonably  make  the  quantum  leap from outer clothes and backpacks to exposure of intimate parts.  The meaning of such a search, and the degradation its subject may reasonably feel, place a search that intru- sive  in  a  category  of  its  own  demanding  its  own  specific suspicions. IVA school official searching a student is “entitled to quali- fied immunity where clearly established law does not show that the search violated the Fourth Amendment.”  Pearsonv. Callahan, 555 U. S.     ,      (2009) (slip op., at 18).  To be established  clearly,  however,  there  is  no  need  that  “thevery action in question [have] previously been held unlaw-ful.”  Wilson  v.  Layne,  526  U. S.  603,  615  (1999). The unconstitutionality of outrageous conduct obviously will beunconstitutional,  this  being  the  reason,  as  Judge  Posnerhas said, that “[t]he easiest cases don’t even arise.”   K. H.v. Morgan, 914 F. 2d 846, 851 (CA7 1990).  But even as to action less than an outrage, “officials can still be on noticethat  their  conduct  violates  established  law  . . .  in  novelfactual circumstances.”  Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U. S. 730, 741 (2002).T. L. O.  directed  school  officials  to  limit  the  intrusive-ness of a search, “in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction,” 469 U. S., at 342, and as

 Opinion of the Court we have just said at some length, the intrusiveness of the strip  search  here  cannot  be  seen  as  justifiably  related  to the  circumstances.   But  we  realize  that  the  lower  courts have  reached  divergent  conclusions  regarding  how  the T. L. O. standard applies to such searches.A  number  of  judges  have  read  T. L. O.  as  the  en  banc minority of the Ninth Circuit did here.   The Sixth Circuitupheld a strip search of a high school student for a drug,without any suspicion that drugs were hidden next to her body.   Williams v. Ellington, 936 F. 2d 881, 882–883, 887(1991).   And other courts considering qualified immunityfor  strip  searches  have  read  T. L. O.  as  “a  series  of  ab- stractions, on the one hand, and a declaration of seeming deference  to  the  judgments  of  school  officials,  on  the other,” Jenkins v. Talladega City Bd. of Ed., 115 F. 3d 821,828  (CA11  1997)  (en  banc),  which  made  it  impossible  “to establish  clearly  the  contours  of  a  Fourth  Amendmentright  . . .  [in]  the  wide  variety  of  possible  school  settingsdifferent from those involved in T. L. O.” itself.   Ibid.   See also Thomas v. Roberts, 323 F. 3d 950 (CA11 2003) (grant- ing qualified immunity to a teacher and police officer who conducted a group strip search of a fifth grade class when looking for a missing $26).We think these differences of opinion from our own are substantial  enough  to  require  immunity  for  the  school officials  in this  case.   We  would  not  suggest  that  entitle- ment  to  qualified  immunity  is  the  guaranteed  product  of disuniform views of the law in the other federal, or state, courts, and the fact that a single judge, or even a group of judges,  disagrees  about  the  contours  of  a  right  does  not automatically  render  the  law  unclear  if  we  have  been clear.   That said, however, the cases viewing school strip searches differently from the way we see them are numer- ous  enough,  with  well-reasoned  majority  and  dissenting opinions, to counsel doubt that we were sufficiently clear in the prior statement of law.   We conclude that qualified

 immunity is warranted. VThe  strip  search  of  Savana  Redding  was  unreasonable and a violation of the Fourth Amendment, but petitioners Wilson,  Romero,  and  Schwallier  are  nevertheless  pro- tected  from  liability  through  qualified  immunity.           Our conclusions  here  do  not  resolve,  however,  the  question  of the liability of petitioner Safford Unified School District #1 under Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436U. S.  658,  694  (1978),  a  claim  the  Ninth  Circuit  did  not address.   The  judgment  of  the  Ninth  Circuit  is  therefore affirmed  in  part  and  reversed  in  part,  and  this  case  is remanded for consideration of the Monell claim. It is so ordered.

    Cite as:  557 U. S.                       (2009)       1 Opinion of STEVENS, J. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 08–479  SAFFORD UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT #1, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. APRIL REDDING ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT [June 25, 2009] JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE GINSBURG  joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part.In  New  Jersey  v.  T. L. O.,  469  U. S.  325  (1985),  the Court  established  a  two-step  inquiry  for  determining  the reasonableness  of  a  school  official’s  decision  to  search  a student.   First,  the  Court  explained,  the  search  must  be“ ‘justified at its inception’ ” by the presence of “reasonable grounds  for  suspecting  that  the  search  will  turn  up  evi- dence  that  the  student  has  violated  or  is  violating  either the law or the rules of the school.”  Id., at 342.  Second, the search   must   be   “permissible   in   its   scope,”   which   is achieved   “when   the   measures   adopted   are   reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.”  Ibid. (emphasis added).Nothing   the   Court   decides   today   alters   this   basic framework.  It simply applies T. L. O. to declare unconsti- tutional a strip search of a 13-year-old honors student that was  based  on  a  groundless  suspicion  that  she  might  be hiding medicine in her underwear.   This is, in essence, a case in which clearly established law meets clearly outra- geous  conduct. I  have  long  believed  that  “ ‘[i]t  does  not require  a  constitutional  scholar  to  conclude  that  a  nude search  of  a  13-year-old  child  is  an  invasion  of  constitu- tional  rights  of  some  magnitude.’ ” Id.,  at  382,  n.  25

    2       SAFFORD UNIFIED SCHOOL DIST. #1 v. REDDING Opinion of STEVENS, J. (STEVENS,  J.,  concurring  in  part  and  dissenting  in  part) (quoting Doe v. Renfrow, 631 F. 2d 91, 92–93 (CA7 1980)). The strip search of Savana Redding in this case was both more  intrusive  and  less  justified  than  the  search  of  the student’s purse in T. L. O.  Therefore, while I join Parts I– III  of  the  Court’s  opinion,  I  disagree  with  its  decision  to extend  qualified  immunity  to  the  school  official  who  au- thorized this unconstitutional search.The Court reaches a contrary conclusion about qualified immunity based on the fact that various Courts of Appealshave  adopted  seemingly  divergent  views  about  T.  L.  O.’sapplication to strip searches.  Ante, at 12.   But the clarityof a well-established right should not depend on whether jurists have misread our precedents.  And while our caseshave  previously  noted  the  “divergence  of  views”  among courts in deciding whether to extend qualified immunity,e.g.,  Pearson  v.  Callahan,  (2009)  555  U. S.,             ,          (slip op., at 20) (noting the unsettled constitutionality of the so-called  “consent-once-removed”  doctrine);  Wilson  v.  Layne,526 U. S. 603, 618 (1999) (considering conflicting views on the  constitutionality  of  law  enforcement’s  practice  of  al-lowing the media to enter a private home to observe and film attempted arrests), we have relied on that considera-tion  only  to  spare  officials  from  having  “ ‘to  predict  the future  course  of  constitutional  law,’ ”  Id.,  at  617  (quoting Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U. S. 555, 562 (1978); empha-sis  added). In  this  case,  by  contrast,  we  chart  no  new constitutional  path.   We  merely  decide  whether  the  deci-sion  to  strip  search  Savana  Redding,  on  these  facts,  was prohibited  under  T.  L.  O.              Our  conclusion  leaves  theboundaries of the law undisturbed.*——————* In fact, in T. L. O. we cited with approval a Ninth Circuit case, Bil- brey v. Brown, 738   F. 2d 1462 (1984), which held that a strip search performed under similar circumstances violated the Constitution.  New Jersey v. T. L. O., 469 U. S. 325, 332, n. 2 (1985); id., at 341, and n. 6 (adopting Bilbrey’s reasonable suspicion standard).

    Cite as:  557 U. S.                       (2009)       3 Opinion of STEVENS, J. The  Court  of  Appeals  properly  rejected  the  school  offi- cial’s qualified immunity defense, and I would affirm that court’s judgment in its entirety.

 Opinion of GINSBURG, J. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 08–479  SAFFORD UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT #1, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. APRIL REDDING 

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