Actualidad

Meléndez-Díaz v. Massachusetts (6/25/2009 TSEU)

10 de Junio de 2010

Inadmisible en evidencia informe forense sobre resultado analisis droga si no testifica el que lo hizo.

http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/08pdf/07-591.pdf

(Slip Opinion)       OCTOBER  TERM,  2008                  1 Syllabus NOTE:  Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being  done  in  connection  with  this  case,  at  the  time  the  opinion  is  issued. The  syllabus  constitutes  no  part  of  the  opinion  of  the  Court  but  has  been prepared  by  the  Reporter  of  Decisions  for  the  convenience  of  the  reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES  Syllabus MELENDEZ-DIAZ v. MASSACHUSETTS CERTIORARI TO THE APPEALS COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS No. 07–591.    Argued November 10, 2008—Decided June 25, 2009At petitioner’s state-court drug trial, the prosecution introduced certifi-cates of state laboratory analysts stating that material seized by po- lice and connected to petitioner was cocaine of a certain quantity.  As required by Massachusetts law, the certificates were sworn to beforea notary public and were submitted as prima facie evidence of what they asserted.  Petitioner objected, asserting that Crawford v. Wash- ington, 541 U. S. 36, required the analysts to testify in  person. Thetrial  court  disagreed,  the  certificates  were  admitted,  and  petitioner was convicted.  The Massachusetts Appeals Court affirmed, rejecting petitioner’s  claim  that  the  certificates’  admission  violated  the  SixthAmendment.Held: The   admission   of   the   certificates   violated   petitioner’s   SixthAmendment right to confront the witnesses against him.  Pp. 3–23.(a)  Under Crawford, a witness’s testimony against a defendant is inadmissible unless the witness appears at trial or, if the witness is unavailable,   the   defendant   had   a   prior   opportunity   for   cross- examination.   541  U. S.,  at  54.   The  certificates  here  are  affidavits, which  fall  within  the  “core  class  of  testimonial  statements”  covered by the Confrontation Clause, id., at 51.   They asserted that the sub- stance   found   in   petitioner’s   possession   was,   as   the   prosecution claimed, cocaine of a certain weight—the precise testimony the ana- lysts would be expected to provide if called at trial.  Not only were the certificates  made,  as  Crawford  required  for  testimonial  statements, “under  circumstances  which  would  lead  an  objective  witness  rea- sonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial,” id., at 52, but under the relevant Massachusetts law their sole  purpose  was  to  provide  prima  facie  evidence  of  the  substance’s composition, quality, and net weight.   Petitioner was entitled to “be confronted with” the persons giving this testimony at trial.  Id., at 54.


 

 Syllabus Pp. 3–5.(b) The  arguments  advanced  to  avoid  this  rather  straightforward application  of  Crawford  are  rejected.    Respondent’s  claim  that  theanalysts are not subject to confrontation because they are not “accu-satory” witnesses finds no support in the Sixth Amendment’s text or in  this  Court’s  case  law.   The  affiants’  testimonial  statements  werenot  “nearly  contemporaneous”  with  their  observations,  nor,  if  theyhad been, would that fact alter the statements’ testimonial character. There is no support for the proposition that witnesses who testify re-garding  facts  other  than  those  observed  at  the  crime  scene  are  ex-empt from confrontation.   The absence of interrogation is irrelevant;a witness who volunteers his testimony is no less a witness for Sixth Amendment purposes.  The affidavits do not qualify as traditional of- ficial or business records.  The argument that the analysts should not be subject to confrontation because their statements result from neu- tral scientific testing is little more than an invitation to return to the since-overruled  decision  in  Ohio  v.  Roberts,  448  U. S.  56,  66,  which held  that  evidence  with  “particularized  guarantees  of  trustworthi- ness”  was  admissible  without  confrontation.    Petitioner’s  power  to subpoena the analysts is no substitute for the right of confrontation. Finally, the requirements of the Confrontation Clause may not be re- laxed because they make the prosecution’s task burdensome.  In any event, the practice in many States already accords with today’s deci- sion, and the serious disruption predicted by respondent and the dis- sent has not materialized.  Pp. 5–23.69 Mass. App. 1114, 870 N. E. 2d 676, reversed and remanded. SCALIA,  J.,  delivered  the  opinion  of  the  Court,  in  which  STEVENS, SOUTER, THOMAS, and GINSBURG, JJ., joined.  THOMAS, J., filed a concur- ring  opinion.   KENNEDY, J.,  filed  a  dissenting  opinion,  in  which  ROB- ERTS, C. J., and BREYER and ALITO, JJ., joined.


 

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary  print of  the  United  States  Reports.    Readers  are  requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash- ington,  D. C.  20543,  of  any  typographical  or  other  formal  errors,  in  order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 07–591  LUIS E. MELENDEZ-DIAZ, PETITIONER v.MASSACHUSETTS ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE APPEALS COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS [June 25, 2009] JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.The  Massachusetts  courts  in  this  case  admitted  into evidence affidavits reporting the results of forensic analy- sis  which  showed  that  material  seized  by  the  police  and connected  to  the  defendant  was  cocaine.             The  question presented  is  whether  those  affidavits  are  “testimonial,” rendering  the  affiants  “witnesses”  subject  to  the  defen- dant’s right of confrontation under the Sixth Amendment. IIn  2001,  Boston  police  officers  received  a  tip  that  a Kmart employee, Thomas Wright, was engaging in suspi- cious  activity.                      The  informant  reported  that  Wright  re- peatedly received phone calls at work, after each of which he would be picked up in front of the store by a blue sedan, and  would  return  to  the  store  a  short  time  later.                            The police  set  up  surveillance  in  the  Kmart  parking  lot  and witnessed  this  precise  sequence  of events.   When  Wright got out of the car upon his return, one of the officers de- tained and searched him, finding four clear white plastic bags  containing  a  substance  resembling  cocaine.                                          The officer  then  signaled  other  officers  on  the  scene  to  arrest


 

 Opinion of the Court the two men in the car—one of whom was petitioner Luis Melendez-Diaz.       The  officers  placed  all  three  men  in  a police cruiser.During the short drive to the police station, the officers observed  their  passengers  fidgeting  and  making  furtivemovements  in  the  back  of  the  car.         After  depositing  themen  at  the  station,  they  searched  the  police  cruiser  and found  a  plastic  bag  containing  19  smaller  plastic  bagshidden in the partition between the front and back seats.They  submitted  the  seized  evidence  to  a  state  laboratory required by law to conduct chemical analysis upon police request.  Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 111, §12 (West 2006). Melendez-Diaz  was  charged  with  distributing  cocaine and with trafficking in cocaine in an amount between 14 and  28  grams.   Ch.  94C,  §§32A,  32E(b)(1).   At  trial,  the prosecution  placed  into  evidence  the  bags  seized  from Wright  and  from  the  police  cruiser.           It  also  submitted three  “certificates  of  analysis”  showing  the  results  of  the forensic analysis performed on the seized substances.  The certificates  reported  the  weight  of  the  seized  bags  and stated  that  the  bags  “[h]a[ve]  been  examined  with  the following  results:  The  substance  was  found  to  contain: Cocaine.”  App. to Pet. for Cert. 24a, 26a, 28a.  The certifi- cates were sworn to before a notary public by analysts at the  State  Laboratory  Institute  of  the  Massachusetts  De- partment  of  Public  Health,  as  required  under  Massachu- setts law.  Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 111, §13.Petitioner  objected  to  the  admission  of  the  certificates, asserting that our Confrontation Clause decision in Craw- ford  v.  Washington,  541  U. S.  36  (2004),  required  the analysts to testify in person.  The objection was overruled, and  the  certificates  were  admitted  pursuant  to  state  law as  “prima  facie  evidence  of  the  composition,  quality,  and the net weight of the narcotic . . . analyzed.”   Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 111, §13.The  jury  found  Melendez-Diaz  guilty.            He  appealed,


 

 contending,  among  other  things,  that  admission  of  the certificates  violated  his  Sixth  Amendment  right  to  be confronted with the witnesses against him.   The Appeals Court  of  Massachusetts  rejected  the  claim,  affirmance order,  69  Mass.  App.  1114,  870  N. E.  2d  676,  2007  WL2189152,  *4,  n. 3  (July  31,  2007),  relying  on  the  Massa- chusetts  Supreme  Judicial  Court’s  decision  in  Common-wealth v. Verde, 444 Mass. 279, 283–285, 827 N. E. 2d 701,705–706 (2005), which held that the authors of certificatesof forensic analysis are not subject to confrontation under the  Sixth  Amendment.   The  Supreme  Judicial  Court  de- nied review.  449 Mass. 1113, 874 N. E. 2d 407 (2007).  We granted certiorari.  552 U. S.            (2008). IIThe  Sixth  Amendment  to  the  United  States  Constitu- tion,  made  applicable  to  the  States  via  the  Fourteenth Amendment,  Pointer  v.  Texas,  380  U. S.  400,  403  (1965), provides  that  “[i]n  all  criminal  prosecutions,  the  accused shall  enjoy  the  right  . . .  to  be  confronted  with  the  wit- nesses  against  him.”          In  Crawford,  after  reviewing  the Clause’s historical underpinnings, we held that it guaran- tees a defendant’s right to confront those “who ‘bear testi- mony’ ”  against  him.   541  U. S.,  at  51.   A  witness’s  testi- mony against a defendant is thus inadmissible unless the witness appears at  trial or, if the  witness is  unavailable, the          defendant         had   a     prior     opportunity       for         cross- examination.  Id., at 54.Our  opinion  described  the  class  of  testimonial  state- ments covered by the Confrontation Clause as follows:“Various  formulations  of  this  core  class  of  testimo- nial  statements  exist:  ex  parte  in-court  testimony  or its functional equivalent—that is, material such as af- fidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably


 

 Opinion of the Court expect  to  be  used  prosecutorially;  extrajudicial  state- ments . . . contained in formalized testimonial materi- als, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions;  statements  that  were  made  under  cir- cumstances  which  would  lead  an  objective  witness reasonably  to  believe  that  the  statement  would  be available for use at a later trial.”  Id., at 51–52 (inter- nal quotation marks and citations omitted). There is little doubt that the documents at issue in this case fall within the “core class of testimonial statements” thus described.  Our description of that category mentions affidavits twice.   See also White v. Illinois, 502 U. S. 346,365 (1992) (THOMAS, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (“[T]he Confrontation Clause is implicated by extrajudicial statements only insofar as they are contained in  formalized  testimonial  materials,  such  as  affidavits, depositions,  prior  testimony,  or  confessions”).                                         The  docu- ments at issue here, while denominated by Massachusetts law  “certificates,”  are  quite  plainly  affidavits:  “declara- tion[s] of facts written down and sworn to by the declarant before an officer authorized to administer oaths.”   Black’s Law Dictionary 62 (8th ed. 2004).  They are incontroverti- bly  a  “ ‘solemn  declaration  or  affirmation  made  for  the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.’ ”   Crawford, supra, at 51 (quoting 2 N. Webster, An American Diction- ary of the English Language (1828)).  The fact in questionis that the substance found in the possession of Melendez- Diaz   and   his   codefendants   was,   as   the   prosecution claimed,   cocaine—the   precise   testimony   the   analysts would be expected to provide if called at trial.  The “certifi- cates” are functionally identical to live, in-court testimony, doing  “precisely  what  a  witness  does  on  direct  examina- tion.”             Davis  v.  Washington,  547  U. S.  813,  830  (2006) (emphasis deleted).Here,  moreover,  not  only  were  the  affidavits  “ ‘made


 

 under  circumstances  which  would  lead  an  objective  wit- ness  reasonably  to  believe  that  the  statement  would  be available for use at a later trial,’ ” Crawford, supra, at 52, but under Massachusetts law the sole purpose of the affi- davits was to provide “prima facie evidence of the composi- tion,  quality,  and  the  net  weight”  of  the  analyzed  sub- stance,  Mass.  Gen.  Laws,  ch.  111,  §13.                      We  can  safely assume  that  the  analysts  were  aware  of  the  affidavits’ evidentiary purpose, since that purpose—as stated in the relevant state-law provision—was reprinted on the affida- vits themselves.  See App. to Pet. for Cert. 25a, 27a, 29a.In  short,  under  our  decision  in  Crawford  the  analysts’ affidavits  were  testimonial  statements,  and  the  analysts were  “witnesses”  for  purposes  of  the  Sixth  Amendment. Absent  a  showing  that  the  analysts  were  unavailable  to testify at trial and that petitioner had a prior opportunityto  cross-examine  them,  petitioner  was  entitled  to  “ ‘be confronted with’ ” the analysts at trial.   Crawford, supra, at 54.1 IIIRespondent  and  the  dissent  advance  a  potpourri  of ——————1 Contrary to the dissent’s suggestion, post, at 3–4, 7 (opinion of KEN- NEDY,  J.),  we  do  not  hold,  and  it  is  not  the  case,  that  anyone  whose testimony may be relevant in establishing the chain of custody, authen- ticity of the sample, or accuracy of the testing device, must appear in person  as  part  of  the  prosecution’s  case.   While  the  dissent  is  correct that  “[i]t  is  the  obligation  of  the  prosecution  to  establish  the  chain  of custody,” post, at 7, this does not mean that everyone who laid hands on the evidence must be called.   As stated in the dissent’s own quotation, ibid., from United States v. Lott, 854 F. 2d 244, 250 (CA7 1988), “gaps in  the  chain  [of  custody]  normally  go  to  the  weight  of  the  evidence rather than its admissibility.”  It is up to the prosecution to decide what steps in the chain of custody are so crucial as to require evidence; but what testimony is introduced must (if the defendant objects) be intro- duced live.   Additionally, documents prepared in the regular course of equipment  maintenance  may  well  qualify  as  nontestimonial  records.See infra, at 15–16, 18.


 

 Opinion of the Court analytic   arguments   in   an   effort   to   avoid   this   rather straightforward  application  of  our  holding  in  Crawford. Before  addressing  them,  however,  we  must  assure  the reader of the falsity of the dissent’s opening  alarum that we  are  “sweep[ing]  away  an  accepted  rule  governing  the admission  of  scientific  evidence”  that  has  been  “estab- lished for at least 90 years” and “extends across at least 35States  and  six  Federal  Courts  of  Appeals.”             Post,  at  1 (opinion of KENNEDY, J.).The  vast  majority  of  the  state-court  cases  the  dissent cites  in  support  of  this  claim  come  not  from  the  last  90years, but from the last 30, and not surprisingly nearly allof them rely on our decision in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U. S.56  (1980),  or  its  since-rejected  theory  that  unconfronted testimony  was  admissible  as  long  as  it  bore  indicia  ofreliability, id., at 66.  See post, at 30.2    As for the six Fed-eral  Courts  of  Appeals  cases  cited  by  the  dissent,  five  of them postdated and expressly relied on Roberts.  See post, at 21–22.   The sixth predated Roberts but relied entirely on the same erroneous theory.   See Kay v. United States,255  F. 2d  476,  480–481  (CA4  1958)  (rejecting  confronta- tion clause challenge “where there is reasonable necessity for  [the  evidence]  and  where  .  .  .  the  evidence  has  those qualities of reliability and trustworthiness”).A review of cases that predate the Roberts era yields a mixed picture.   As the dissent notes, three state supremecourt  decisions  from  the  early  20th  century  denied  con-frontation with respect to certificates of analysis regardinga substance’s alcohol content.  See post, at 21 (citing cases ——————2 The exception is a single pre-Roberts case that relied on longstand- ing  Massachusetts  precedent. See  Commonwealth  v.  Harvard,  356Mass. 452, 462, 253 N. E. 2d 346, 352 (1969).  Others are simply irrele- vant,  since  they  involved  medical  reports  created  for  treatment  pur-poses, which would not be testimonial under our decision today.   See,e.g., Baber v. State, 775 So. 2d 258, 258–259 (Fla. 2000); State v. Gar- lick, 313 Md. 209, 223–225, 545 A. 2d 27, 34–35 (1998).


 

 from   Massachusetts,   Connecticut,   and   Virginia).               But other  state  courts  in  the  same  era  reached  the  opposite conclusion.  See Torres v. State, 18 S. W. 2d 179, 180 (Tex. Crim. App. 1929); Volrich v. State, No. 278, 1925 WL 2473 (Ohio App., Nov. 2, 1925).   At least this much is entirely clear:  In  faithfully  applying Crawford  to the facts of this case,  we  are  not  overruling  90  years  of  settled  jurispru- dence.   It is the dissent that seeks to overturn precedent by  resurrecting  Roberts  a  mere  five  years  after  it  was rejected in Crawford.We  turn  now  to  the  various  legal  arguments  raised  by respondent and the dissent. ARespondent  first  argues  that  the  analysts  are  not  sub- ject  to  confrontation  because  they  are  not  “accusatory” witnesses, in that they do not directly accuse petitioner of wrongdoing;  rather,  their  testimony  is  inculpatory  only when  taken  together  with  other  evidence  linking  peti- tioner  to  the  contraband.         See  Brief  for  Respondent  10. This finds no support in the text of the Sixth Amendment or in our case law.The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right “to  be  confronted  with  the  witnesses against  him.”   (Em- phasis added.)   To the extent the analysts were witnesses(a question resolved above), they certainly provided testi- mony against petitioner, proving one fact necessary for hisconviction—that the  substance he possessed was  cocaine. The contrast between the text of the Confrontation Clauseand  the  text  of  the  adjacent  Compulsory  Process  Clause confirms  this  analysis.                                           While  the  Confrontation  Clause guarantees a defendant the right to be confronted with thewitnesses  “against  him,”  the  Compulsory  Process  Clause guarantees a defendant the right to call witnesses “in hisfavor.”  U. S. Const., Amdt. 6.  The text of the Amendment contemplates  two  classes  of  witnesses—those  against  the


 

 Opinion of the Court defendant  and  those  in  his  favor.   The  prosecution  must produce  the  former;3   the  defendant  may  call  the  latter. Contrary  to  respondent’s  assertion,  there  is  not  a  third category   of   witnesses,   helpful   to   the   prosecution,   but somehow immune from confrontation.It  is  often,  indeed  perhaps  usually,  the  case  that  an adverse  witness’s  testimony,  taken  alone,  will  not  sufficeto  convict.     Yet  respondent  fails  to  cite  a  single  case  inwhich such testimony was admitted absent a defendant’s opportunity to cross-examine.4    Unsurprisingly, since sucha holding would be contrary to longstanding case law.   InKirby  v.  United  States,  174  U. S.  47  (1899),  the  Court considered Kirby’s conviction for receiving stolen property, the evidence for which consisted, in part, of the records of conviction  of  three  individuals  who  were  found  guilty  of stealing  the  relevant  property.                                                         Id.,  at  53.    Though  this evidence proved only that the property was stolen, and not that  Kirby  received  it,  the  Court  nevertheless  ruled  that admission of the records violated Kirby’s rights under the Confrontation Clause.  Id., at 55.  See also King v. Turner,1 Mood. 347, 168 Eng. Rep. 1298 (1832) (confession by one defendant to having stolen certain goods could not be used——————3 The  right  to  confrontation  may,  of  course,  be  waived,  including  by failure to object to the offending evidence; and States may adopt proce- dural rules governing the exercise of such objections.  See infra, at 21.4 Respondent  cites  our  decision  in  Gray  v.  Maryland,  523  U. S.  185 (1998).            That  case  did  indeed  distinguish  between  evidence  that  is “incriminating on its face” and evidence that “bec[omes] incriminating. . .  only  when  linked  with  evidence  introduced  later  at  trial, ”  id.,  at191 (internal quotation marks omitted).   But it did so for the entirely different  purpose  of  determining  when  a  nontestifying  codefendant’sconfession,  redacted  to  remove  all  mention  of  the  defendant,  could  be admitted into evidence with instruction for the jury not to consider the confession as evidence against the nonconfessor.   The very premise ofthe case was that, without the limiting instruction even admission of a redacted  confession  containing  evidence  of  the  latter  sort  would  have violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights.  See id., at 190–191.


 

 as  evidence  against  another  defendant  accused  of  receiv- ing the stolen property). BRespondent  and  the  dissent  argue  that  the  analysts should not be subject to confrontation because they are not “conventional” (or “typical” or “ordinary”) witnesses of the sort whose ex parte  testimony was  most notoriously used at the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh.  Post, at 15–16; Brief for Respondent  28.            It  is  true,  as  the  Court  recognized  in Crawford,  that  ex  parte  examinations  of  the  sort  used  at Raleigh’s  trial  have  “long  been  thought  a  paradigmatic confrontation violation.”   541 U. S., at 52.   But the para- digmatic case identifies the core of the right to confronta- tion,  not  its  limits.  The  right  to  confrontation  was  not invented  in  response  to  the  use  of  the  ex  parte  examina- tions in Raleigh’s Case, 2 How. St. Tr. 1 (1603).   That use provoked  such  an  outcry  precisely  because  it  flouted  the deeply  rooted  common-law  tradition  “of  live  testimony  in court subject to adversarial testing.”   Crawford, supra, at43 (citing 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws ofEngland  373–374  (1768)).         See  also  Crawford,  supra,  at43–47.In any case, the purported distinctions respondent and the  dissent  identify  between  this  case  and  Sir  WalterRaleigh’s “conventional” accusers do not survive scrutiny.The  dissent  first  contends  that  a  “conventional  witness recalls  events  observed  in  the  past,  while  an  analyst’sreport contains near-contemporaneous observations of thetest.”     Post,  at  16–17.      It  is  doubtful  that  the  analyst’s reports  in  this  case  could  be  characterized  as  reporting “near-contemporaneous  observations”;  the  affidavits  were completed almost a week after  the  tests  were  performed. See  App.  to  Pet.  for  Cert.  24a–29a  (the  tests  were  per- formed on November 28, 2001, and the affidavits sworn on December 4, 2001).  But regardless, the dissent misunder-


 

 Opinion of the Court stands the role that “near-contemporaneity” has played in our case law.  The dissent notes that that factor was given “substantial weight” in Davis, post, at 17, but in fact that decision disproves the dissent’s position.   There the Court considered the admissibility of statements made to police officers responding to a report of a domestic disturbance. By the time officers arrived the assault had ended, but the victim’s  statements—written  and  oral—were  sufficiently close  in  time  to  the  alleged  assault  that  the  trial  court admitted  her  affidavit  as  a  “present  sense  impression.” Davis,  547  U. S.,  at  820  (internal  quotation  marks  omit- ted).           Though  the  witness’s  statements  in  Davis  were “near-contemporaneous”  to  the  events  she  reported,  we nevertheless held that they could not be admitted absent an opportunity to confront the witness.  Id., at 830.A second reason the dissent contends that the analysts are not “conventional witnesses” (and thus not subject toconfrontation)  is  that  they  “observe[d]  neither  the  crimenor  any  human  action  related  to  it.”           Post,  at  17.      The dissent provides no authority for this particular limitationof the type of witnesses subject to confrontation.  Nor is it conceivable  that  all  witnesses  who  fit  this  description would  be  outside  the  scope  of  the  Confrontation  Clause.For  example,  is  a  police  officer’s  investigative  report  de- scribing the crime scene admissible absent an opportunityto examine the officer?  The dissent’s novel exception fromcoverage  of  the  Confrontation  Clause  would  exempt  all expert   witnesses—a   hardly   “unconventional”   class   of witnesses.A  third  respect  in  which  the  dissent  asserts  that  the analysts  are  not  “conventional”  witnesses  and  thus  notsubject to confrontation is that their statements were not provided in response to interrogation.  Ibid.  See also Brieffor Respondent 29.   As we have explained, “[t]he Framers were  no  more  willing  to  exempt  from  cross-examinationvolunteered testimony or answers to open-ended questions


 

 than  they  were  to  exempt  answers  to  detailed  interroga- tion.”  Davis, supra, at 822–823, n. 1.  Respondent and the dissent cite no authority, and we are aware of none, hold- ing that a person who volunteers his testimony is any lessa  “ ‘witness  against’  the  defendant,”  Brief  for  Respondent26,  than  one  who  is  responding  to  interrogation.   In  any event, the analysts’ affidavits in this case were presentedin response to a police request.   See Mass. Gen. Laws, ch.111,  §§12–13.   If  an  affidavit  submitted  in  response  to  a police  officer’s  request  to  “write  down  what  happened”suffices to trigger the Sixth Amendment’s protection (as itapparently  does, see Davis, 547 U. S., at 819–820; id., at840, n. 5 (THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting  in  part)),  then  the  analysts’  testimony  shouldbe subject to confrontation as well. CRespondent  claims  that  there  is  a  difference,  for  Con- frontation Clause purposes, between testimony recounting historical events, which is “prone to distortion or manipu- lation,”  and  the  testimony  at  issue  here,  which  is  the “resul[t]  of  neutral,  scientific  testing.”   Brief  for  Respon- dent 29.  Relatedly, respondent and the dissent argue that confrontation of forensic analysts would be of little value because  “one  would  not  reasonably  expect  a  laboratory professional . . . to feel quite differently about the resultsof  his  scientific  test  by  having  to  look  at  the  defendant.”Id., at 31 (internal quotation marks omitted); see post, at10–11.This argument is little more than an invitation to returnto  our  overruled  decision  in  Roberts,  448  U. S.  56,  which held   that   evidence   with   “particularized   guarantees   of trustworthiness”   was   admissible   notwithstanding   the Confrontation Clause.   Id., at 66.   What we said in Craw- ford in response to that argument remains true:“To be sure, the Clause’s ultimate goal is to ensure re-


 

 Opinion of the Court liability of evidence, but it is a procedural rather thana substantive guarantee.   It commands, not that evi- dence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in aparticular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination.  . . .  Dispensing  with  confrontation  be- cause  testimony  is  obviously  reliable  is  akin  to  dis- pensing  with  jury  trial  because  a  defendant  is  obvi- ously guilty.   This is not what the Sixth Amendment prescribes.”  541 U. S., at 61–62. Respondent  and  the  dissent  may  be  right  that  there  are other ways—and in some cases better ways—to challenge or verify the results of a forensic test.5    But the Constitu- tion  guarantees  one  way:  confrontation.   We  do  not  have license to suspend the Confrontation Clause when a pref- erable trial strategy is available.Nor  is  it  evident  that  what  respondent  calls  “neutral scientific testing” is as neutral or as reliable as respondentsuggests.  Forensic evidence is not uniquely immune from the  risk  of  manipulation.                                                 According  to  a  recent  study conducted under the auspices of the National Academy ofSciences,  “[t]he  majority  of  [laboratories  producing  foren- sic  evidence]  are  administered  by  law  enforcement  agen-cies,  such  as  police  departments,  where  the  laboratory administrator reports to the head of the agency.”  National Research Council of the National Academies, Strengthen-ing Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward6–1 (Prepublication Copy Feb. 2009) (hereinafter NationalAcademy Report).  And “[b]ecause forensic scientists often are driven in their work by a need to answer a particular question  related  to  the  issues  of  a  particular  case,  they sometimes  face  pressure  to  sacrifice  appropriate  method- ology for the sake of expediency.”  Id., at S–17.  A forensic——————5 Though surely not always.   Some forensic analyses, such as autop- sies and breathalyzer tests, cannot be repeated, and the specimens used for other analyses have often been lost or degraded.


 

 analyst  responding  to  a  request  from  a  law  enforcement official may feel pressure—or have an incentive—to alter the evidence in a manner favorable to the prosecution. Confrontation is one means of assuring accurate forensic analysis.           While  it  is  true,  as  the  dissent  notes,  that  an honest analyst will not alter his testimony when forced to confront  the  defendant,  post,  at  10,  the  same  cannot  be said  of  the  fraudulent  analyst.  See  Brief  for  National Innocence  Network  as  Amicus  Curiae  15–17  (discussing cases of documented “drylabbing” where forensic analysts report  results  of  tests  that  were  never  performed);  Na- tional  Academy  Report  1–8  to   1–10  (discussing  docu- mented cases of fraud and error involving the use of foren- sic evidence).   Like the eyewitness who has fabricated his account  to  the  police,  the  analyst  who  provides  false  re- sults  may,  under  oath  in  open  court,  reconsider  his  false testimony.   See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U. S. 1012, 1019 (1988). And,  of  course,  the  prospect  of  confrontation  will  deter fraudulent analysis in the first place.Confrontation  is  designed  to  weed  out  not  only  the fraudulent   analyst,   but   the   incompetent   one   as   well. Serious  deficiencies  have  been  found  in  the  forensic  evi- dence  used  in  criminal  trials.   One  commentator  asserts that  “[t]he  legal  community  now  concedes,  with  varying degrees  of  urgency,  that  our  system  produces  erroneous convictions   based   on   discredited   forensics.”              Metzger, Cheating  the  Constitution,  59  Vand.  L.  Rev.  475,  491 (2006).   One study of cases in which exonerating evidence resulted  in  the  overturning  of  criminal  convictions  con- cluded  that  invalid  forensic  testimony  contributed  to  the convictions in 60% of the cases.   Garrett & Neufeld, Inva- lid Forensic Science Testimony and Wrongful Convictions,95  Va.  L.  Rev.  1,  14  (2009).   And  the  National  AcademyReport concluded:“The  forensic  science  system,  encompassing  both  re-


 

 Opinion of the Court search  and  practice,  has  serious  problems  that  can only  be  addressed  by  a  national  commitment  to  over- haul  the  current  structure  that  supports  the  forensic science  community  in  this  country.”       National  Acad- emy Report P–1 (emphasis in original).6 Like   expert   witnesses   generally,   an   analyst’s   lack   of proper training or deficiency in judgment may be disclosed in cross-examination.This case is illustrative.  The affidavits submitted by the analysts  contained  only  the  bare-bones  statement  that“[t]he substance was found to contain: Cocaine.”   App. toPet. for Cert. 24a, 26a, 28a.  At the time of trial, petitioner did not know what tests the analysts performed, whetherthose  tests  were  routine,  and  whether  interpreting  theirresults  required  the  exercise  of  judgment  or  the  use  of skills that the analysts may not have possessed.  While we still do not know the precise tests used by the analysts, we are  told  that  the  laboratories  use  “methodology  recom- mended by the Scientific Working Group for the Analysisof  Seized  Drugs,”  App.  to  Brief  for  Petitioner  1a–2a.   At least  some  of  that  methodology  requires  the  exercise  of judgment  and  presents  a  risk  of  error  that  might  be  ex- plored  on  cross-examination.                      See  2  P.  Giannelli  &  E. Imwinkelried,  Scientific  Evidence  §23.03[c],  pp.  532–533, ch.  23A,  p.  607  (4th  ed.  2007)  (identifying  four  “critical errors”  that  analysts  may  commit  in  interpreting  the ——————6 Contrary to the dissent’s suggestion, post, at 23, we do not “rel[y] in such great measure” on the deficiencies of crime-lab analysts shown by this report to resolve the constitutional question presented in this case. The  analysts  who  swore  the  affidavits  provided  testimony  against Melendez-Diaz,  and  they  are  therefore  subject  to  confrontation;  we would  reach  the  same  conclusion  if  all  analysts  always  possessed  the scientific  acumen  of  Mme.  Curie  and  the  veracity  of  Mother  Teresa. We discuss the report only to refute the suggestion that this category of evidence is uniquely reliable and that cross-examination of the analysts would be an empty formalism.


 

 results  of  the  commonly  used  gas  chromatography/mass spectrometry analysis);                          Shellow,        The            Application                of Daubert to the Identification of Drugs, 2 Shepard’s Expert&  Scientific  Evidence  Quarterly  593,  600  (1995)  (noting that while spectrometers may be equipped with computer-ized matching systems, “forensic analysts in crime labora-tories  typically  do  not  utilize  this  feature  of  the  instru- ment, but rely exclusively on their subjective judgment”).The same is true of many of the other types of forensicevidence      commonly      used     in    criminal      prosecutions. “[T]here  is  wide  variability  across  forensic  science  disci- plines  with  regard  to  techniques,  methodologies,  reliabil- ity, types and numbers of potential errors, research, gen- eral   acceptability,   and   published   material.”    National Academy Report S–5.   See also id., at 5–9, 5–12, 5–17, 5–21  (discussing  problems  of  subjectivity,  bias,  and  unreli- ability of common forensic tests such as latent fingerprintanalysis,  pattern/impression  analysis,  and  toolmark  and firearms  analysis).   Contrary  to  respondent’s  and  thedissent’s  suggestion,  there  is  little  reason  to  believe  that confrontation will be useless in testing analysts’ honesty, proficiency, and methodology—the features that are com-monly the focus in the cross-examination of experts. DRespondent   argues   that   the   analysts’   affidavits   are admissible without confrontation because they are “akin to the  types  of  official  and  business  records  admissible  at common law.”  Brief for Respondent 35.  But the affidavits do  not  qualify  as  traditional  official  or  business  records, and  even  if  they  did,  their  authors  would  be  subject  to confrontation nonetheless.Documents  kept  in  the  regular  course  of  business  may ordinarily   be   admitted   at   trial   despite   their   hearsaystatus.   See  Fed.  Rule  Evid.  803(6).   But  that  is  not  thecase  if  the  regularly  conducted  business  activity  is  the


 

 Opinion of the Court production  of  evidence  for  use  at  trial.            Our  decision  in Palmer  v.  Hoffman,  318  U. S.  109  (1943),  made  that  dis- tinction  clear.           There  we  held  that  an  accident  report provided  by  an  employee  of  a  railroad  company  did  not qualify as a business record because, although kept in the regular  course  of  the  railroad’s  operations,  it  was  “calcu- lated for use essentially in the court, not in the business.” Id., at 114.7    The analysts’ certificates—like police reports generated by law enforcement officials—do not qualify as business  or  public  records  for  precisely  the  same  reason. See  Rule  803(8)  (defining  public  records  as  “excluding, however,  in  criminal  cases  matters  observed  by  police officers and other law enforcement personnel”).Respondent seeks to rebut this limitation by noting that at  common  law  the  results  of  a  coroner’s  inquest  wereadmissible without an opportunity for confrontation.   Butas we have previously noted, whatever the status of coro- ner’s  reports  at  common  law  in  England,  they  were  notaccorded  any  special  status  in  American  practice.             SeeCrawford,  541  U. S.,  at  47,  n. 2;  Giles  v.  California,  554U. S.      ,       (2008) (slip op., at 20) (BREYER, J., dissent- ing); Evidence—Official Records—Coroner’s Inquest, 65 U.Pa. L. Rev. 290 (1917).The  dissent  identifies  a  single  class  of  evidence  which, though prepared for use at trial, was traditionally admis-sible:  a  clerk’s  certificate  authenticating  an  official  re-cord—or a copy thereof—for use as evidence.   See post, at19.   But  a  clerk’s  authority  in  that  regard  was  narrowly circumscribed.        He  was  permitted  “to  certify  to  the  cor-rectness of a copy of a  record kept in his office,” but had——————7 The  early  common-law  cases  likewise  involve  records  prepared  for the  administration  of  an  entity’s  affairs,  and  not  for  use  in  litigation. See, e.g., King v. Rhodes, 1 Leach 24, 168 Eng. Rep. 115 (1742) (admit- ting  into  evidence  ship’s  muster-book);  King  v.  Martin,  2  Camp.  100,101, 170 Eng. Rep. 1094, 1095 (1809) (vestry book); King v. Aickles, 1Leach 390, 391–392, 168 Eng. Rep. 297, 298 (1785) (prison logbook).


 

 “no  authority  to  furnish,  as  evidence  for  the  trial  of  a lawsuit, his interpretation of what the record contains or shows,  or  to  certify  to  its  substance  or  effect.”   State  v. Wilson,  141  La.  404,  409,  75  So.  95,  97  (1917).   See  also State  v.  Champion,  116  N. C.  987,  21  S. E.  700,  700–701 (1895); 5 J. Wigmore, Evidence §1678 (3d ed. 1940).   The dissent  suggests  that  the  fact  that  this  exception  was“ ‘narrowly circumscribed’ ” makes no difference.   See post,at 20.   To the contrary, it makes all the difference in the world.   It  shows  that  even  the  line  of  cases  establishing the  one  narrow  exception  the  dissent  has  been  able  to identify simultaneously vindicates the general rule appli- cable  to  the  present  case.   A  clerk  could  by  affidavit  au- thenticate  or  provide  a  copy  of  an  otherwise  admissible record, but could not do what the analysts did here: createa record for the sole purpose of providing evidence againsta defendant.8Far  more  probative  here  are  those  cases  in  which  the prosecution sought to admit into evidence a clerk’s certifi-cate attesting to the fact that the clerk had searched for aparticular  relevant  record  and  failed  to  find  it.   Like  the testimony  of  the  analysts  in  this  case,  the  clerk’s  state- ment  would  serve  as  substantive  evidence  against  the defendant whose guilt depended on the nonexistence of the record for which the clerk searched.   Although the clerk’s certificate  would  qualify  as  an  official  record  under  re- spondent’s definition—it was prepared by a  public officer in  the  regular  course  of  his  official  duties—and  although ——————8 The dissent’s  reliance on our decision in  Dowdell v.  United States,221 U. S. 325 (1911), see post, at 20 (opinion of KENNEDY, J.), is simi- larly misplaced.   As the opinion stated in Dowdell—and as this Courtnoted in Davis v. Washington, 547 U. S. 813, 825 (2006)—the judge andclerk who made the statements at issue in Dowdell were not witnesses for  purposes  of  the  Confrontation  Clause  because  their  statements concerned  only  the  conduct  of  defendants’  prior  trial,  not  any  facts regarding defendants’ guilt or innocence.  221 U. S., at 330–331.


 

 Opinion of the Court the clerk was certainly not a “conventional witness” under the  dissent’s  approach,  the  clerk was  nonetheless subjectto confrontation.   See People v. Bromwich, 200 N. Y. 385,388–389, 93 N. E. 933, 934 (1911); People v. Goodrode, 132Mich.  542,  547,  94  N. W.  14,  16  (1903);  Wigmore,  supra,§1678.9Respondent  also  misunderstands  the  relationship  be- tween the business-and-official-records hearsay exceptions and the Confrontation Clause.  As we stated in Crawford: “Most  of  the  hearsay  exceptions  covered  statements  that by  their  nature  were  not  testimonial—for  example,  busi- ness records or statements in furtherance of a conspiracy.”541 U. S., at 56.  Business and public records are generally admissible  absent  confrontation  not  because  they  qualifyunder  an  exception  to  the  hearsay  rules,  but  because—having  been  created  for  the  administration  of  an  entity’s affairs and not for the purpose of establishing or provingsome fact at trial—they are not testimonial.   Whether ornot  they  qualify  as  business  or  official  records,  the  ana- lysts’  statements  here—prepared  specifically  for  use  atpetitioner’s  trial—were  testimony  against  petitioner,  andthe analysts were subject to confrontation under the SixthAmendment. ERespondent  asserts  that  we  should  find  no  Confronta- ——————9 An  earlier  line  of  19th  century  state-court  cases  also  supports  the notion  that  forensic  analysts’  certificates  were  not  admitted  into  evi- dence as public  or  business  records.   See  Commonwealth  v.  Waite,  93Mass. 264, 266 (1865); Shivers v. Newton, 45 N. J. L. 469, 476 (Sup. Ct.1883); State v. Campbell, 64 N. H. 402, 403, 13 A. 585, 586 (1888).   In all  three  cases,  defendants—who  were  prosecuted  for  selling  adulter- ated milk—objected to the admission of the state chemists’ certificatesof analysis.   In all three cases, the objection was defeated because the chemist testified live at trial.   That the prosecution came forward with live witnesses in all three cases suggests doubt as to the admissibilityof the certificates without opportunity for cross-examination.


 

 tion  Clause  violation  in  this  case  because  petitioner  had the  ability  to  subpoena  the  analysts.                                  But  that  power— whether pursuant to state law or the Compulsory Process Clause—is  no  substitute  for  the  right  of  confrontation. Unlike  the  Confrontation  Clause,  those  provisions  are  of no use to the defendant when the witness is unavailable or simply  refuses  to  appear.       See,  e.g.,  Davis,  547  U. S.,  at820  (“[The  witness]  was  subpoenaed,  but  she  did  not  ap- pear  at  . . .  trial”).                                       Converting  the  prosecution’s  duty under the Confrontation Clause into the defendant’s privi- lege  under  state  law  or  the  Compulsory  Process  Clause shifts the consequences of adverse-witness no-shows from the  State  to  the  accused.   More  fundamentally,  the  Con- frontation Clause imposes a burden on the prosecution to present its witnesses, not on the defendant to bring those adverse witnesses into court.  Its value to the defendant is not  replaced  by  a  system  in  which  the  prosecution  pre- sents its evidence via ex parte affidavits and waits for the defendant to subpoena the affiants if he chooses. FFinally, respondent asks us to relax the requirements of the Confrontation Clause to accommodate the “ ‘necessitiesof trial and the adversary process.’ ”   Brief for Respondent59.  It is not clear whence we would derive the authority to do so.   The Confrontation Clause may make the prosecu-tion  of  criminals  more  burdensome,  but  that  is  equallytrue of the right to trial by jury and the privilege against self-incrimination.   The  Confrontation  Clause—like  thoseother  constitutional  provisions—is  binding,  and  we  maynot disregard it at our convenience.We  also  doubt  the  accuracy  of  respondent’s  and  the dissent’s dire predictions.  The dissent, respondent, and itsamici highlight the substantial total number of controlled- substance analyses performed by state and federal labora-tories  in  recent  years.      But  only  some  of  those  tests  are


 

 Opinion of the Court implicated  in  prosecutions,  and  only  a  small  fraction  of those  cases  actually  proceed  to  trial.                                                            See  Brief  for  Law Professors as Amici Curiae 7–8 (nearly 95% of convictionsin state and federal courts are obtained via guilty plea).10Perhaps  the  best  indication  that  the  sky  will  not  fall after  today’s  decision  is  that  it  has  not  done  so  already. Many States have already adopted the constitutional rule we announce today,11  while many others permit the defen- dant  to  assert  (or  forfeit  by  silence)  his  Confrontation Clause  right  after  receiving  notice  of  the  prosecution’s intent  to  use  a  forensic  analyst’s  report,  id.,  at  13–15 (cataloging  such  state  laws).                                       Despite  these  widespread practices,  there  is  no  evidence  that  the  criminal  justice system has ground to a halt in the States that, one way or another, empower a defendant to insist upon the analyst’s appearance  at  trial.            Indeed,  in  Massachusetts  itself,  a defendant  may  subpoena  the  analyst  to  appear  at  trial, see Brief for Respondent 57, and yet there is no indication——————10 The  dissent  provides  some  back-of-the-envelope  calculations  re- garding the number of court appearances that will result from today’s ruling.    Post,  at  13–14.    Those  numbers  rely  on  various  unfounded assumptions:  that  the  prosecution  will  place  into  evidence  a  drug analysis certificate in every case; that the defendant will never stipu- late to the nature of the controlled substance; that even where no such stipulation  is  made,  every  defendant  will  object  to  the  evidence  or otherwise demand the appearance of the analyst.   These assumptions are wildly unrealistic, and, as discussed below, the figures they produce do not reflect what has in fact occurred in those jurisdictions that have already adopted the rule we announce today.11 State  v.  Johnson,  982  So.  2d  672,  680–681  (Fla.  2008);  Hinojos- Mendoza  v.  People,  169  P.  3d  662,  666–667  (Colo.  2007);  State  v.Birchfield,  342  Ore.  624,  631–632,  157  P. 3d  216,  220  (2007);  State  v.March, 216 S. W. 3d 663, 666–667 (Mo. 2007); Thomas v. United States,914 A. 2d 1, 12–13 (D. C. 2006); State v. Caulfield, 722 N. W. 2d 304,310 (Minn. 2006); Las Vegas v. Walsh, 121 Nev. 899, 904–906, 124 P. 3d203, 207–208 (2005); People v. McClanahan, 191 Ill. 2d 127, 133–134,729 N. E. 2d 470, 474–475 (2000); Miller v. State, 266 Ga. 850, 854–855,472  S.  E.  2d  74,  78–79  (1996);  Barnette  v.  State,  481  So.  2d  788,  792 (Miss. 1985).


 

 that obstructionist defendants are abusing the privilege.The dissent finds this evidence “far less reassuring than promised.”  Post, at 28.  But its doubts rest on two flawedpremises.       First,  the  dissent  believes  that  those  statestatutes  “requiring  the  defendant  to  give  early  notice  of his  intent  to  confront  the  analyst,”  are  “burden-shifting statutes [that] may be invalidated by the Court’s reason- ing.”  Post, at 22, 28–29.  That is not so.  In their simplest form, notice-and-demand statutes require the prosecutionto  provide  notice  to  the  defendant  of  its  intent  to  use  an analyst’s  report  as  evidence  at  trial,  after  which  the  de- fendant is given a period of time in which he may object to the admission of the evidence absent the analyst’s appear- ance  live  at  trial.          See,  e.g,  Ga.  Code  Ann.  §35–3–154.1 (2006); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 38.41, §4 (Vernon2005);  Ohio  Rev.  Code  Ann.  §2925.51(C)  (West  2006). Contrary  to  the  dissent’s  perception,  these  statutes  shiftno burden whatever.   The defendant always has the bur-den  of  raising  his  Confrontation  Clause  objection;  notice- and-demand statutes simply govern the time within whichhe must do so.   States are free to adopt procedural rulesgoverning objections.   See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U. S.72, 86–87 (1977).       It is common to require a defendant to exercise  his  rights  under  the  Compulsory  Process  Clausein advance  of trial, announcing his intent to  present cer-tain  witnesses.       See  Fed.  Rules  Crim.  Proc.  12.1(a),  (e),16(b)(1)(C);  Comment:  Alibi  Notice  Rules:  The  PreclusionSanction  as  Procedural  Default,  51  U.  Chi.  L.  Rev.  254,254–255,   281–285   (1984)   (discussing   and   cataloguingState  notice-of-alibi  rules);  Taylor  v.  Illinois,  484  U.  S.400, 411 (1988); Williams v. Florida, 399 U. S. 78, 81–82 (1970).      There  is  no  conceivable  reason  why  he  cannotsimilarly   be   compelled   to   exercise   his   ConfrontationClause rights before trial.  See Hinojos-Mendoza v. People,169 P. 3d 662, 670 (Colo. 2007) (discussing and approvingColorado’s notice-and-demand provision).  Today’s decision


 

 Opinion of the Court will  not  disrupt  criminal  prosecutions  in  the  many  large States  whose  practice  is  already  in  accord  with  the  Con- frontation Clause.12Second, the dissent notes that several of the state-court cases that have already adopted this rule did so pursuantto our decision in Crawford, and not “independently . . . asa matter of state law.”   Post, at 28.   That may be so.   But in assessing the likely practical effects of today’s ruling, itis irrelevant why those courts adopted this rule; it mattersonly that they did so.   It is true that many of these deci- sions are recent, but if the dissent’s dire predictions were accurate, and given the large number of drug prosecutions at the state level, one would have expected immediate and dramatic results.  The absence of such evidence is telling. But  it  is  not  surprising.     Defense  attorneys  and  their clients will often stipulate to the nature of the substance in  the  ordinary  drug  case.     It  is  unlikely  that  defense counsel  will  insist  on  live  testimony  whose  effect  will  be merely to highlight rather than cast doubt upon the foren- sic  analysis.   Nor  will  defense  attorneys  want  to  antago- nize the judge or jury by wasting their time with the ap- pearance  of  a  witness  whose  testimony  defense  counsel does not intend to rebut in any fashion.13   The amicus brief ——————12 As  the  dissent  notes,  post,  at  27,  some  state  statutes,  “requir[e] defense  counsel  to  subpoena  the  analyst,  to  show  good  cause  for  de- manding the analyst’s presence, or even to affirm under oath an intentto cross-examine the analyst.”   We have  no occasion today  to  pass on the  constitutionality  of  every  variety  of  statute  commonly  given  the notice-and-demand label.  It suffices to say that what we have referredto as the “simplest form [of] notice-and-demand statutes,” supra, at 21,is  constitutional;  that  such  provisions  are  in  place  in  a  number  of States;  and  that  in  those  States,  and  in  other  States  that  require confrontation  without  notice-and-demand,  there  is  no  indication  that the dire consequences predicted by the dissent have materialized.13 Contrary to the dissent’s suggestion, post, at 24–25, we do not castaspersions  on  trial  judges,  who  we  trust  will  not  be  antagonized  by good-faith requests for analysts’ appearance at trial.  Nor do we expect


 

 filed  by  District  Attorneys  in  Support  of  the  Common- wealth  in  the  Massachusetts  Supreme  Court  case  upon which the Appeals Court here relied said that “it is almost always  the  case  that  [analysts’  certificates]  are  admitted without objection.   Generally, defendants do not object to the  admission  of  drug  certificates  most  likely  because there  is  no  benefit  to  a  defendant  from  such  testimony.” Brief  for  District  Attorneys  in  Support  of  the  Common- wealth in No. SJC–09320 (Mass.), p. 7 (footnote omitted). Given  these  strategic  considerations,  and  in  light  of  the experience in those States that already provide the same or similar protections to defendants, there is little reasonto  believe  that  our  decision  today  will  commence  the  pa- rade of horribles respondent and the dissent predict. *        *        *This case involves little more than the application of our holding  in  Crawford  v.  Washington,  541  U.  S.  36.                                                  The Sixth  Amendment  does  not  permit  the  prosecution  to prove its case via ex parte out-of-court affidavits, and the admission  of  such  evidence  against  Melendez-Diaz  was error.14    We therefore reverse the judgment of the Appeals Court  of  Massachusetts  and  remand  the  case  for  further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.  


 

 ——————
It is so ordered.


 

defense attorneys to refrain from zealous representation of their clients. We simply do not expect defense attorneys to believe that their clients’ interests (or their own) are furthered by objections to analysts’ reports whose conclusions counsel have no intention of challenging.14 We of course express no view as to whether the error was harmless. The  Massachusetts  Court  of  Appeals  did  not  reach  that  question  andwe decline to address it in the first instance.  Cf. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U. S.1012,   1021–1022   (1988).            In   connection   with   that   determination, however,  we  disagree  with  the  dissent’s  contention,  post,  at  25,  that“only  an  analyst’s  testimony  suffices  to  prove  [the]  fact”  that  “the substance is cocaine.”   Today’s opinion, while insisting upon retentionof the confrontation requirement, in no way alters the type of evidence(including circumstantial evidence) sufficient to sustain a conviction.

 

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